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INTRODUCTION 
n its purest form, the law of contracts is premised on the ideal of a 
transaction between parties of equal bargaining strength, who enter 
a mutually binding and beneficial agreement through the give and 
take of an open and fair negotiation. But the realities of a modern 
market economy have required adjustments to that ideal. The law 
pertaining to adhesion contracts provides an apt example of one such 
adjustment. In those agreements, the negotiated contract gives way to 
the form contract in order to promote efficiencies of scale that will 
benefit both businesses and consumers (and the economy in general) 
by permitting the parties to forego the formalities of negotiation and 
mutual assent. This alteration to contract law was justified to allow 
businesses to reduce their transaction costs,1 which translates as a 
benefit to consumers in the form of lower prices for goods and 
services.2 Any such adjustment, however, should not undermine the 
basic idea of a mutually beneficial agreement between the parties. 
This is the role played by the doctrine of unconscionability with 
respect to the enforceability of adhesion contracts. It provides the 
consumer an “out” from adhesion contracts that do not, at least 
indirectly, reflect the value of a mutually beneficial agreement. 
The era of the Internet has spawned a new species of adhesion 
contracts, accompanied by a new series of challenges to contract law. 
We are in the throes of a conflict between online businesses and 
consumers, in which Internet businesses use aggressive online 
adhesion contracts to create vast economic empires,3 and in which 
 
1 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 438–39 (2002). 
2 See id. at 437–38. 
3 See Leon E. Trakman, Adhesion Contracts and the Twenty First Century Consumer 6 
(Univ. New S. Wales Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 2007-67) [hereinafter Adhesion 
Contracts] (the “tension is between a code that facilitates merchant practice in a free 
market and a code that protects consumer interests from the predatory practices of large 
I
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consumers have few resources to resist this virtual onslaught on their 
privacy and property rights. The unconscionability doctrine, formed 
in a different era, is not up to the task. As a consequence, consumers 
are losing the battle. As numerous scholars have pointed out, new 
rules of engagement are needed to restore the balance of interests 
between contracting parties in the online market.4 
Scholars and courts have suggested a variety of ways to resolve 
this conflict, but the proposed solutions offered thus far have yet to 
achieve a sensible balance between the interests of relevant parties. 
These solutions tend to err on one side or the other. For example, 
some of the solutions limit their applicability to unconscionable terms 
while ignoring other subtler terms that are even more invasive on 
consumers’ privacy and property rights. Other solutions rely on a 
spontaneous adoption by the actors in the market that, so far, has not 
happened. This Article, borrowing from recent directives on 
consumer protection adopted in the European Union (EU), suggests 
the adoption of a measured, relatively precise standard against which 
to check the validity of online contracts. This standard strikes a 
balance between the conflicting interests at stake and is designed to 
reflect and address actual practices and challenges in the online 
market. 
Part I provides a historical and critical overview of adhesion 
contracts, from their earliest forms in the late nineteenth century, up 
through their most recent manifestations in the online market. Next, 
Part II discusses the problems that consumers now face as a result of 
the broad adoption and enforcement of online contracts. Some of 
these problems derive from traditional adhesion contracts, and others 
 
scale producers of goods and services”); see generally Leon E. Trakman, The Boundaries 
of Contract Law in Cyberspace, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 187 (2008) [hereinafter Boundaries of 
Contract Law]. 
4 See generally Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to 
Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. 
REV. 227 (2007); Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied 
Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, 
Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995) 
[hereinafter Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses]; Mark. A. Lemley, Terms of 
Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459 (2006) [hereinafter Terms of Use]; Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. 
McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How the Law Went 
Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (2011); W. 
David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by 
Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21 (1984) [hereinafter New Meaning of Contract]; 
Adhesion Contracts, supra note 3; Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1. 
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are unique to online contracts. Part III assesses a variety of proposals 
designed to address the challenges to contract law in the context of 
online contracts. Part IV then analyzes the approach adopted in 
Europe to protect consumers’ rights and the way countries in the EU 
have adapted this approach to their own system. Finally, Part V 
develops and recommends the adoption of a standard that will restore 
balance to the contractual relationships between online businesses and 
consumers of online products. 
I 
THE ORIGIN OF THE CONFLICT 
Many words have been spent on adhesion contracts and online 
contracts.5 While this Article intends to briefly provide a description 
of the debate amongst scholars on these topics, it is important to 
present these contracts as an evolution of adhesion contracts. This 
will be helpful through the analysis of the conflict between consumers 
and businesses, and it will help draft rules that may effectively solve 
this conflict. 
A. Adhesion Contracts 
As previously stated and as generally understood, the idea behind 
adhesion contracts is to offer an opportunity to businesses to save on 
transaction costs by presenting their customers with standard forms 
with boilerplate terms.6 Given that these standard forms are the same 
for every consumer of a specific business, businesses do not have to 
hire lawyers to customize every single contract.7 Also, the uniformity 
of transactions derived from the adoption of the same forms allows 
businesses to predict the risks of transacting.8 
When courts acknowledged businesses’ adoption of adhesion 
contracts, they did so with a specific goal: help businesses flourish in 
 
5 In this Article, the term “online contracts” will be used to generally refer to different 
kinds of electronic contracts, such as click-wrap and browse-wrap contracts, with different 
names such as “Terms of Service,” “End User License Agreement (EULA),” “Terms and 
Conditions,” etc. 
6 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26 (1990); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981) (“Standardization of 
agreements serves many of the same functions as standardization of goods and services; 
both are essential to a system of mass production and distribution. Scarce and costly time 
and skill can be devoted to a class of transactions rather than to details of individual 
transactions.”). 
7 New Meaning of Contract, supra note 4, at 24. 
8 Id. 
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a delicate time. In fact, between the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, extreme individualism was declining, and larger 
businesses were replacing smaller ones.9 Interstate commerce was 
booming, and businesses were reaching out to a higher-than-usual 
number of consumers.10 Adhesion contracts were the best solution to 
allow businesses to draft and execute contracts fast and efficiently. 
These contracts were first introduced to help specific markets, such as 
the insurance market, but they soon spread over to other markets, 
becoming the standard contracts offered to consumers.11 
Adhesion contracts deeply changed the importance of full 
negotiation and mutual assent, which are the very essence of 
traditional contracts.12 In fact, with adhesion contracts, consumers 
usually lack any opportunity to negotiate the one-sided terms offered 
by businesses, and they have to accept these terms under take-it-or-
leave-it conditions.13 These contracts also create the false expectation 
that consumers will read several pages of terms,14 which is generally 
unlikely.15 The result is that these contracts allow businesses to bind 
consumers over terms that the consumers most likely never read and, 
therefore, ignore. 
Scholars were the first to recognize this new type of contract and 
warned about the risks deriving from their use.16 Courts somehow 
ignored this warning and welcomed adhesion contracts, possibly 
because the benefits granted to businesses were expected to transfer 
 
9 Id. at 28–29. 
10 See id. at 25. 
11 See Adhesion Contracts, supra note 3, at 7 n.13; see also New Meaning of Contract, 
supra note 4, at 25. 
12 Id. at 23. 
13 Adhesion Contracts, supra note 3, at 11. 
14 The duty to read is usually connected to the objective theory in contract law. But as 
underlined, for example, by Professor Todd Rakoff, “[t]his ‘duty’ can just as well be 
viewed as a refusal to impose any duty on the drafting party to ascertain whether form 
terms are known and understood.” Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1187 (1983). 
15 See Nancy S. Kim, The Duty to Draft Reasonably and Online Contracts, in 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 181, 187–88 (Larry A. 
DiMatteo et al. eds., 2013) (“The inability to negotiate terms is a primary reason that few 
consumers actually read the terms of standard contracts. Courts, however, impose a duty to 
read on non-drafting parties to a contract even, incongruously, consumers in the context of 
standard form contracts who are inclined not to read the terms because of the futility of 
doing so. Because of the objective theory of contracts, a party who manifests assent to a 
contract may not later escape it by claiming that he or she did not read the terms.”). 
16 See New Meaning of Contract, supra note 4, at 31–46. 
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over to consumers in the form of reduced prices for goods and 
services. Unfortunately, as already briefly stated in the Introduction, 
this did not happen. Businesses took advantage of the lack of mutual 
assent typical of these contracts and started including unconscionable 
terms, imposing harsh conditions, and limiting consumers’ rights.17 
Consumers can still seek protection from these contracts under the 
unconscionability doctrine, but this defense has limits that make it an 
ineffective defense, as explained later in this Article. 
B. The Introduction of Shrink-Wrap Contracts 
Adhesion contracts were the first example of the mitigation of the 
traditional rules of contract formation. “Shrink-wrap” contracts 
expanded this mitigation of rules and lowered the importance of 
mutual assent even more. A shrink-wrap scenario usually includes a 
business as the seller of software and another business or consumer as 
the buyer.18 The software’s package displays only some of the 
contractual terms, usually the most generic ones.19 After the sale has 
been finalized and the buyer opens the package, the buyer may find 
additional contractual terms, usually displayed on the screen when the 
software is run or in a booklet located inside the box.20 
A shrink-wrap contract is similar to an adhesion contract because it 
allows businesses to draft one-sided terms in advance as standard 
forms. At the same time, a shrink-wrap contract is different from an 
adhesion contract. An adhesion contract presents consumers with all 
the terms at the time of signature, while a shrink-wrap contract 
discloses only part of its terms at the time of purchase and only 
discloses the additional terms at a later time.21 
Courts initially refused to enforce any additional terms22 disclosed 
after the sale had been finalized under the theory of lack of mutual 
 
17 This is evidenced by the multitude of cases filed regarding unconscionable terms in 
adhesion contracts. 
18 See Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 4, at 1241. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 “[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of 
mutual assent to the exchange and consideration.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 17 (1981). In view of this and in light of UCC section 2-207 (2002), courts 
that were called to consider the enforceability of shrink-wrap agreements before ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg decided for the agreements’ unenforceability. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. 
Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105 (3d Cir. 1991); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. 
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assent and under UCC section 2-207 (2002) (Additional Terms in 
Acceptance or Confirmation). The much-debated case ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg23 endorsed these contracts and drastically changed the 
approach to them. 
In ProCD, Zeidenberg purchased a disk from ProCD that contained 
a database created by the seller.24 The box containing the disk had 
only part of the contractual agreement printed on it.25 After 
purchasing the disk, Zeidenberg tried to install the software and was 
presented with an on-screen window containing ProCD’s terms.26 
Unbeknownst to Zeidenberg at the time of purchase, the terms of the 
contract included restrictions on the use of the data, including a 
prohibition against reselling the data contained on the disk.27 ProCD 
filed a claim asserting that Zeidenberg had impliedly agreed to be 
bound by the terms presented in the on-screen window, and that he 
had violated these additional terms by using the data contained in the 
disk to develop and sell his own database.28 Zeidenberg argued that 
those additional terms were not part of the agreement because he was 
presented with them only after the purchase.29 
Judge Easterbrook rejected Zeidenberg’s defense and stated that 
the additional terms displayed to the buyer after the purchase of the 
software would still bind the defendant, even if he might have ignored 
their existence at the time of purchase.30 Judge Easterbrook, evidently 
inspired by the “legal realism” doctrine,31 justified his decision and 
 
Supp. 750, 761 (E.D. La. 1987), aff’d, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Foresight Res. Corp. 
v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (D. Kan. 1989). 
23 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Cheryl B. Preston and Eli W. McCann consider this 
case “a key that opened the gates to broader enforcement of adhesive form contracts 
generally and allowed the new ungated form contract to morph into the truly unruly TOS, 
a beast untied from the contexts in which form contracts gained (limited) legitimacy.” 
Preston & McCann, supra note 4, at 2. 





29 See id. 
30 Id. at 1451. 
31 See Jane K. Winn & Brian H. Bix, Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting 
in the U.S. and EU, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV 175, 179 (2006) (explaining how “legal realism,” 
or “the way that judges will manipulate the doctrine to achieve the outcomes they 
otherwise consider fair or practical,” can be seen in “Judge Easterbrook’s unwillingness to 
follow UCC formation rules in ProCD v. Zeidenberg and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.”). “In 
these cases, it seems that the courts will try to find a way to enforce terms if they think that 
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tried to mitigate its consequences for consumers by explaining that 
according to the contract, the buyer could have rejected the additional 
terms and returned the software. 
This case shares the same policy rationale as other cases related to 
adhesion contracts: the need to help businesses flourish in a 
challenging time. As said before,32 courts acknowledged the advent of 
adhesion contracts and struggled to find a way to protect the weaker 
contracting party without threatening the principle of freedom of 
contract.33 In ProCD, Judge Easterbrook wanted to assist software 
manufacturing businesses by endorsing a pro-businesses approach to 
shrink-wrap contracts.34 On one hand, the court observed that printing 
all the terms and conditions on the package of the software was not 
feasible and would have impeded businesses from using the surface of 
the package for information more useful to buyers (e.g., hardware 
requirements, software features, etc.).35 On the other hand, the matter 
at stake in this case (the sale of software) presented, for the first time, 
the unique issue of ease of duplication of digital content and the need 
 
non-enforcement would lead to unjust enrichment of a bad actor, or would cause 
significant inconvenience, with little purpose, to businesses.” Id. The same analysis of 
Judge Easterbrook’s decision as a clear example of “legal realism” can be found in Preston 
& McCann, supra note 4, at 10 (“Rather than resolve the case through the mechanism 
established in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) for dealing with later additions of 
new and different terms, Judge Easterbrook first articulated the result he believed he had to 
obtain for purposes of supporting market economics, and then simply declared that the 
terms were enforceable without much effort to locate a rule somewhere in traditional 
contract law.” (citations omitted)). Without going into the debate concerning “legal 
realism,” I do not personally think that the origin of the current problem arises from Judge 
Easterbrook’s “legal realism”; rather I think it comes from the unnatural effect that the 
ProCD case had over other cases dealing with online contracts and the way this case 
influenced other doctrines, such as the browse-wrap doctrine. 
32 See supra Part I.A. 
33 Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion–Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 633 (1943). 
34 It is clear in this case that Judge Easterbrook adopted the same ratio already 
highlighted in reference to adhesion contracts, given that he specifically quoted both E. 
Allan Farnsworth and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, previously cited in this 
Article. See sources cited supra note 6. In addition to this, commentators of this case have 
confirmed the same intuition related to the ratio adopted by Judge Easterbrook. See Robert 
J. Morrill, Contract Formation and the Shrink Wrap License: A Case Comment on ProCD, 
Inc v. Zeidenberg, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 513, 516 (1998) (“In the mass market/consumer 
context, the shrink-wrap license provides an efficient way for the software vendor to 
dictate the terms of each sale. . . . In the mass market setting, however, the negotiation of 
terms for each sale is clearly impractical.”); see also Preston & McCann, supra note 4, at 8 
(“in ProCD [Judge Easterbrook] rushes to cut away the broader historical context and 
foundational principles to create a result he thinks is necessary to foster digital markets”). 
35 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. 
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to shape sales contracts more like license agreements than traditional 
sales.36 The license agreement required long and complex contractual 
terms, which limited the rights of consumers,37 and which would have 
been complex to include on the package. 
The ultimate effect of ProCD was to allow businesses to bind 
buyers to terms presented only after the time of purchase, with no 
consequences for the sellers and losses for the consumer.38 Not 
surprisingly, most of the controversial terms are usually included by 
businesses in the terms presented to consumers only after the time of 
purchase. 
Judge Easterbrook’s decision sharpened the conflict between 
businesses and consumers. The introduction and broad adoption of the 
principles arising from ProCD further reduced the importance of 
mutual assent in two ways. First, ProCD endorsed the idea that 
acceptance by performance of unilateral contracts applies to cases in 
which consumers do not have notice of the entirety of the contractual 
terms at the time of purchase (no actual notice of the terms). Second, 
the case also endorsed the idea that implied assent may arise from 
performing an act, such as opening the software package, even when 
the actor is not aware that the same act would indicate assent 
(defective assent).39 ProCD endorsed an approach to shrink-wrap 
contracts that authorizes businesses to take advantage of consumers. 
And this phenomenon got worse with the adoption of browse-wrap 
agreements.40 
 
36 ANDRE R. JAGLOM, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO DISTRIBUTION COUNSELING 
§ 10:29 (2014) (“Traditionally, because of the ease of copying, software publishers have 
licensed, rather than sold their software, so as to avoid the freedom of purchasers under the 
‘first sale doctrine’ of the Copyright Act, to sell and otherwise dispose of lawfully made 
copies.”). 
37 For example, an End User License Agreement (EULA) usually prohibits the buyer 
from selling the digital product to third parties. This is against the first sale doctrine, which 
grants the buyer the right to sell a product to anyone else. In a traditional sales contract, the 
buyer acquires the property of the good purchased. In a sales contract regulated by a 
EULA, the buyer only acquires a license to use the good purchased according to the terms 
and conditions provided in the EULA itself. See generally Michael Terasaki, Do End User 
License Agreements Bind Normal People?, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 467 (2014). 
38 It is fair to observe that the defendant in ProCD could not be properly classified as a 
consumer, but the case did not distinguish between consumers and sophisticated 
purchasers; therefore, we should assume, as many other courts have done, that ProCD 
applies to each and every shrink-wrap agreement. 
39 See Terms of Use, supra note 4, at 467–70. 
40 Mark A. Lemley states that the third “nail in the online assent coffin is the overlap 
between contract claims and concepts of property.” Id. at 470. While I agree that this 
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C. The Introduction of Browse-Wrap Agreements 
ProCD influenced a majority of subsequent court decisions on 
shrink-wrap agreements.41 ProCD also indirectly contributed to the 
development of browse-wrap agreements, and ultimately, to the 
development of the current doctrine of online contracts.42 In a 
browse-wrap agreement, the user of a website is bound by contractual 
terms that are not presented to him upfront.43 Upon visiting a website, 
the user is presented with a hyperlink usually displayed at the bottom 
of the webpage. This hyperlink generally refers to “Terms of Service” 
or “Terms of Use.” Only by clicking on this hyperlink is the user 
directed to the contractual terms that regulate use of the website.44 
 
overlap furthered the dying process of online assent, I believe that a stronger factor leading 
to the diminishing importance of online assent has been played by browse-wrap 
agreements. These agreements contributed in the shifting of contracts of assent, from 
adhesion contracts, through the shrink-wrap doctrine. As stated before, adhesion contracts 
were the first examples of contracts involving consumers in which the latter did not have 
to fully negotiate the terms, and their consent was somehow weaker and less defined than 
the consent that consumers would have given in a fully negotiated contract. From there, 
shrink-wrap agreements further weakened the idea of assent by stating that consumers’ 
assent was not even needed for part of the contract: the contract was included in the 
software’s box and presented to consumers for the first time after opening the box and 
installing the software on their computers. Finally, browse-wrap agreements continued this 
shift by stating that express assent is not needed for the totality of the contract—a contract 
that is not even displayed to the consumer and is briefly presented in the form of a link that 
directs consumers to the full text of the agreement. 
41 See generally Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638–39 (8th Cir. 2005); 
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Meridian 
Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106–07 (E.D. Cal. 2006); 
Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-1859, 2000 WL 1468535 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2000); Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 
85 F. Supp. 2d 519, 527 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. 
Supp. 2d 1086, 1090–91 (N.D. Cal. 2000); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline 
Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 311–13 (Wash. 2000). 
42 Another wrap agreement, the click-wrap agreement, is not individually covered in 
this Article. For a definition of click-wrap agreements, see Specht v. Netscape 
Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 306 F.3d 17 
(2d. Cir. 2002). Click-wrap agreements are not considered individually in this Article 
because they do not present the same troubling issues that browse-wrap agreements do. 
Contrary to browse-wrap agreements, click-wrap agreements present to consumers all the 
terms of service upfront, consumers can choose whether to accept them or reject them, and 
they cannot use the software or the web service without expressing a choice. Specht, 150 
F. Supp. 2d at 594. At the same time, click-wrap agreements share with browse-wrap 
agreements other issues when used in the online environment: inclusion of invasive terms, 
social pressure, and a flawed concept of the duty to read still put consumers at a 
disadvantage. Thus, most of the arguments presented in this Article may also apply to 
click-wrap agreements. 
43 Preston & McCann, supra note 4, at 18. 
44 See id. 
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These terms usually state that continued use of the website will be 
interpreted as implied consent.45 Unlike click-wrap agreements, 
clicking on the hyperlink and reading the terms is not required to 
continue using the website in browse-wrap agreements.46 
Browse-wrap agreements further reduce the already thin relevance 
of consumers’ assent in contract formation and increase the lack of 
actual notice of contractual terms to consumers. Early cases stated 
that browse-wrap agreements were unenforceable. For example, in 
Comb v. PayPal, Inc., the Northern District of California found that a 
contractual term in a browse-wrap agreement was procedurally 
unconscionable because the consumer did not have a chance to 
negotiate the term and had to accept the contract on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis.47 
Unfortunately, the number of cases decided against the 
enforcement of browse-wrap agreements48 is now outnumbered by 
cases supporting the enforcement of these contracts.49 In any event, 
this split by courts does not promote predictability in online 
transactions50 and does not facilitate the adoption of clear standards 




47 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172–73 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
48 For a recent case, see, e.g., Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that a link to the terms—which displayed at the bottom of a web 
page in small print between a link to the privacy policy and the website’s trademark—does 
not provide sufficient notice to the consumer). It is relevant to note that Hines does not 
state that browse-wrap agreements are not enforceable per se, as it merely addresses the 
sufficiency of the notice given by the business to the consumer and provides indirect 
guidance on how to design a website so that a hyperlink to the website’s terms is 
sufficiently visible to a consumer to be considered proper notice, and therefore, bind the 
consumer to the terms. 
49 For a recent case, see, e.g., PDC Laboratories, Inc. v. Hach Co., No. 09-1110, 2009 
WL 2605270 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2009) (terms of the website were hyperlinked on the 
pages of the order process, and the last page of the order process directed the consumer to 
review those terms). 
50 See Boundaries of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 198–99. Trakman stresses the 
difficulty of predicting claims related to ‘wrap contracts by stating that the “further 
purpose is to demonstrate that, however materially similar or different wrap cases may 
appear to be, one may end up attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable.” Id. at 218–19. 
This supports the need to reform online contracts, as suggested in this Article, that will 
bring certainty in this area and that will allow parties—both businesses and consumers—to 
better predict enforcement of terms in ‘wrap contracts. 
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The most indicative case supporting browse-wrap agreements is 
Specht v. Netscape.51 There, the plaintiffs downloaded software from 
a website created and managed by the defendant Netscape.52 In order 
to download this software, the plaintiffs were not required to agree to 
any contractual term; they did not have to sign a contract, nor did they 
have to click on any button to express their agreement.53 The only 
thing plaintiffs had to press was “Download.”54 Defendant argued 
that plaintiffs were bound by its contractual terms because a hyperlink 
at the bottom of the webpage directed the plaintiffs to their full text, 
and because these terms provided that the continued use of the 
website implied their acceptance.55 
While the court rejected the defendant’s claim, it did so only 
because the hyperlink on the webpage was not immediately visible to 
plaintiffs, but required them to scroll down in order for it to become 
visible.56 Specht has been interpreted as the seminal case on browse-
wrap agreements,57 and it has opened the gate to many other cases 
that confirmed the enforceability of browse-wrap agreements.58 This 
gives businesses the opportunity to bind consumers to contractual 
terms by merely placing a hyperlink on a webpage that directs 
consumers to terms that provide for implied consent by performance. 
 
51 While Specht v. Netscape is one of the most relevant cases related to browse-wrap 
agreements, an early use of this term appeared in an earlier case, Pollstar v. Gigmania 
Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000), in which a user entered into an agreement by 
visiting a website. For the purposes of this Article, the definition of “browse-wrap” 
agreement is: terms and conditions which are posted on a website or accessible on the 
screen that do not require the user to expressly manifest assent and in which the user 
manifests assent by taking a specified action, such as continuing to use the website. Kunz 
et al., supra note 4, at 280. 
52 306 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 2002). Netscape Communications, the developers of the 
software discussed in this case, had a fundamental role in the growth of the Internet. In the 
early years of the Internet, Netscape Communicator, developed by Netscape 
Communications, was the leading web browser adopted by users. For instance, Netscape’s 
user share at its highest in 1996 was an outstanding 82.77%, compared to Microsoft 
Internet Explorer’s relatively small 9.6%. See Usage Share of Web Browsers, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usage_share_of _web_browsers (last modified Dec. 21, 
2014). 
53 See Specht, 306 F.3d at 22–23. 
54 Id. at 22. 
55 Id. at 27. 
56 Id. at 32. 
57 Michelle Garcia, Browsewrap: A Unique Solution to the Slippery Slope of the 
Clickwrap Conundrum, 36 CAMPBELL L. REV. 31, 43 (2013). 
58 See cases cited supra note 41. 
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The browse-wrap doctrine is another application of the analysis 
endorsed by courts with reference to adhesion contracts59 and shrink-
wrap agreements.60 Courts wanted to provide websites with an easy 
process for contract formation while avoiding placing a burden on 
consumers’ online experience. Asking websites to display the full text 
of the contractual terms to consumers and obtain their specific 
approval would have badly affected the use of websites in general. 
Courts likely realized that incentivizing the growth of the online 
market was a priority, and that consumers had to pay the price by 
renouncing any residual significance of the importance of their assent. 
Some scholars claim that the current browse-wrap doctrine should 
not concern consumer protection advocates because courts have 
refused to enforce this type of contract when consumers are 
involved.61 While this is true, it cannot be assumed that courts will 
not someday enforce browse-wrap agreements against consumers. On 
the contrary, the fact that no court has expressly stated that browse-
wrap agreements are unenforceable against consumers creates 
uncertainty in the system. 
The extremely mitigated rules on contract formation adopted by the 
browse-wrap agreements allow websites to include any kind of unfair, 
abusive, and invasive terms in their contracts. It is too easy for 
businesses to take advantage of consumers, given that online contracts 
are formed with no actual or constructive notice of the terms and with 
consumers’ implied assent. This makes the online market a dangerous 
environment for consumers. 
D. The Need for a Change 
This Article posits that the current standard of online contract 
formation should be modified. The new standard should protect 
consumers by providing that they should be timely and properly 
informed about the existence and content of contractual terms. 
Additionally, the new standard should reinforce the concept of 
 
59 See supra Part I.A. 
60 See supra Part I.B. 
61 See, e.g., Terms of Use, supra note 4, at 462 (citing the following cases to prove that 
courts have never enforced a browse-wrap agreement against consumers: Campbell v. 
Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 556–57 (1st Cir. 2005); Waters v. 
Earthlink, Inc., 91 F. App’x 697, 698 (1st Cir. 2003); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns 
Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35–38 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
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consumers’ assent while, at the same time, consider the importance of 
a fluid user experience in the usage of today’s websites. 
The time is ripe to introduce such a change. Online businesses do 
not require particular protection or incentive by the legal system 
anymore. The needs and ideas behind the decisions that endorsed 
online contracts no longer exist. In the Internet’s infancy, a formal 
contract information process would have arrested cyberspace’s 
growth. Today, the Internet is part of our everyday life, and a more 
formal process of contract formation—aimed at protecting 
consumers—would most likely not scare users away and would not 
affect the continuing expansion of cyberspace. 
One of the leading technology companies in the world, Apple, Inc., 
provides an interesting lesson on how technological innovation can 
challenge human behavior and requires a soft touch to allow users to 
adapt. Apple also shows us how, once users have finally adapted to 
the technological innovation, the soft touch is not needed anymore. 
This is when innovation is finally free to bloom. 
Apple gently guided its users to learn how to operate a smartphone 
with touch screens by using skeuomorphic design.62 Where users 
were used to operating their devices with a mouse and keyboard, 
Apple had to train them to use a completely new touch interface. At 
first, the company adopted an interface that mirrored real-life 
elements.63 For example, the calendar “app” (application) had the 
shape of the pages of a real calendar; the way users flipped pages of 
an iBook replicated the movement of real pages in a book, including 
sound and animation of those pages.64 This allowed Apple’s users to 
familiarize themselves with the new touch interface using familiar 
elements.65 
 
62 A skeuomorph is “[a]n object or feature that imitates the design of a similar artifact 
made from another material.” Skeuomorph, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxford 
dictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/skeuomorph (last visited Dec. 29, 2014). 
In computing, the same term refers to “an element of a graphical user interface that mimics 
a physical object.” Id. 
63 Austin Carr, Will Apple’s Tacky Software-Design Philosophy Cause a Revolt?, FAST 
CO. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:45 AM), http://www.fastcodesign.com/1670760/will-apples-tacky   
-software-design-philosophy-cause-a-revolt. 
64 See id. 
65 Id. 
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In 2013, several years after the introduction of its first operative 
system for the touch devices, Apple introduced its new iOS 7.66 With 
this version of its OS (operating system), Apple abandoned most of 
the skeuomorphic design and real-life elements and adopted a new 
and innovative look.67 Users were now familiar with the touch 
interface, and they no longer needed guidance. When the design was 
free from the constrictions of the skeuomorphic look, Apple was 
finally able to embrace the full potential of its innovation. 
A similar idea applies to the rules of contract formation for online 
contracts. Here, the mitigation of contract formation rules was the 
necessary transition to reach a comfortable level of awareness—the 
growth of e-commerce and penetration of Internet use—and 
knowledge of the innovation presented by cyberspace. Now, a good 
level of awareness and knowledge has been reached, and adjustments 
and compromise to the detriment of consumers are no longer justified. 
Rules of contract formation can be finally returned to their essence, 
with the importance of mutual assent between parties and actual 
notice to consumers, with reference to the content of contractual 
terms. This will ultimately allow online contracts to evolve to their 
full potential. 
II 
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
By adopting an approach that mitigated the traditional rules of 
contract formation, courts have granted businesses an unfair 
advantage over consumers. Online contracts do not provide 
consumers with sufficient notice of the existence and content of 
contractual terms.68 This makes it easier for businesses to include 
unconscionable and invasive terms. But, lack of notice is not the only 
problem that consumers currently face. Indeed, online contracts 
 
66 Tim Worstall, Apple’s iOS7, Well, It Was Time for Skeuomorphism to Die, FORBES 
(Sept. 19, 2013, 9:44 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/09/19/apples-ios 
7-well-it-was-time-for-skeuomorphism-to-die/. 
67 Id. 
68 Some scholars support courts’ interpretation of browse-wrap agreements—with 
specific regard to the adequacy of notice to consumers of the contractual terms—by way 
of a hyperlink presented on a webpage. See, e.g., Kunz et al, supra note 4, at 305 (“Our 
conclusion, drawing from precedent addressing click-through and browse-wrap 
agreements and from analogous practice in the paper world, such as terms incorporated by 
reference, is that using a hyperlink to disclose electronic standard terms can satisfy the 
proposed requirement of ‘opportunity to review.’”). 
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introduce a new and subtler type of social pressure, which 
compulsively induces consumers to enter into these contracts. What 
follows is a presentation of the main problems that consumers 
currently face with reference to online contracts. 
A. Lack of Sufficient Notice of the Existence and Content of 
Contractual Terms 
The current legal doctrine of browse-wrap agreements focuses on a 
system of notice and implied consent that causes consumers to be 
bound to terms they most likely ignore. The current standard of 
contract formation for these agreements, derived from the leading 
cases decided on this matter,69 has four different prongs that need to 
be met in order to consider a contract enforceable: (1) the consumer 
must receive “adequate notice of the existence of the proposed 
terms,”70 (2) the consumer must have “a meaningful opportunity to 
review the terms,”71 (3) the consumer must receive “adequate notice 
that taking a specified action manifests assent to the terms,”72 and (4) 
the consumer must take “the action specified in the latter notice.”73 
This standard does not protect consumers under such agreements. 
Courts’ interpretation of the adequacy of notice requirement dilutes 
the legal fiction that usually stands behind the concept of constructive 
notice and is of dubious efficacy.74 
 
69 See generally Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000); Ticketmaster 
Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000), 
aff’d, 2 F. App’x 741 (9th Cir. 2001); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 
CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003); Specht v. Netscape 
Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); 
see also Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Farechase, Inc., No. 067-194022-02, 2009 WL 4048496 
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Mar. 8, 2003) (order granting temporary injunction). 
70 Kunz et al., supra note 4, at 281. 
71 Id. It is helpful to consider an interesting view on the interpretation of this specific 
prong of the test provided by the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
(UCITA). Section 113(a) of the UCITA states that: “A person has an opportunity to review 
a record or term only if it is made available in a manner that ought to call it to the attention 
of a reasonable person and permit review.” U.C.I.T.A. § 113(a) (2002). As it has been 
said, the UCITA was—at its origin—a very promising act which then failed to gather 
consensus, and it ultimately was only adopted by two states in the union, Maryland and 
Virginia. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 491 n.314. While UCITA is not 
binding over the interpretation of this test, it is instructive.  
72 Kunz et al., supra note 4, at 281. 
73 Id. 
74 In Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., for example, the court described the way terms were 
presented to the consumer—by way of an abnormal, but not underlined, link on the home 
page which directed consumers to another page, where the terms were displayed in small, 
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With the first prong of the standard, for example, courts have held 
that the presence of a “Terms of Service” hyperlink at the bottom of a 
webpage is sufficient to provide adequate notice to consumers of the 
existence of contractual terms.75 This approach is far too optimistic 
and it ignores an important fact related to consumers’ behavior online: 
most of the popular websites—such as Google, Twitter, and 
Facebook—offer their services for free or under a “freemium” 
model.76 Thus, when consumers visit these websites, they assume that 
they are not entering into any formal contract. In real life, if a person 
is offered an ice cream cone on the street for free, he does not assume 
he is entering into a contract with the vendor. Consumers have the 
same assumption with reference to websites. 
In view of this, if consumers do not expect to enter into any 
contract, it is absurd to assume that the presence of a hyperlink on a 
webpage that merely states “Terms of Service” or just “Terms,” 
usually in small font, should be considered adequate notice of the 
existence and content of these terms. If consumers assume that they 
are not entering into any contract, they will not be on the lookout for 
any kind of term or hyperlink. To assume otherwise means imposing 
a duty on consumers that is even stronger than the duty to read: a duty 
to search for terms. 
The same reasoning can be applied with reference to the third 
prong of the standard. If the placement of a hyperlink should not be 
sufficient to give adequate notice to consumers of the existence of 
contractual terms, the wording of these terms should not be sufficient 
to put consumers on notice that any further action will be interpreted 
as implied assent. If a reasonable consumer will ignore the presence 
 
gray print on a gray background—and it agreed with defendant that many users of the site 
might not have been aware of the license agreement. 170 F. Supp. 2d at 981. At the same 
time, however, the court rejected defendant’s position and denied the motion to dismiss the 
suit for lack of mutual consent, reasoning that consumers are bound to contracts by using 
services or products without first seeing the terms of the contract in many other 
situations—e.g., in insurance contracts, in which the buyer pays the premium before the 
written policy is issued. Id. In addition to Pollstar, in Ticketmaster Corp., the court stated 
it would prefer a rule that required “unmistakable assent” to the contractual terms by 
requiring, for example, clicking on an icon that says “I agree.” 2003 WL 21406289, at *2. 
However, the same court, citing other cases, stated, “the law has not developed this way.” 
Id. 
75 See Kunz et al., supra note 4, at 293. 
76 “Freemium is a pricing strategy by which a product or service (typically a digital 
offering . . . such as software, media, games or web services) is provided free of charge, 
but money (premium) is charged for proprietary features, functionality, or virtual goods.” 
Freemium, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freemium (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
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of the hyperlink, he will not click on it, and he will miss the wording 
of the contract. 
It is time to replace this faulty concept of constructive notice, based 
on what is really inadequate notice, with a new concept that is more 
respectful of consumers and more consistent with their true online 
behavior. As described infra,77 we need to adopt a standard that 
switches from passive and ineffective notice to active notice that 
requires consumers to express their assent to unconscionable and 
invasive terms. 
B. Unconscionable Terms 
The consequence of the current browse-wrap standard is that 
consumers may end up bound by terms they did not have an actual 
opportunity to read. This circumstance increases the risk that 
consumers may be bound to unconscionable terms included in online 
contracts by dishonest businesses. 
Examples of unconscionable terms are highlighted in cases such as 
Gatton v. T-Mobile.78 There, the telephone carrier required by 
contracts that purchasers submit to binding arbitration for any claim 
related to the carrier’s practice.79 The same arbitration clause also 
provided for a waiver of class action claims.80 The court declined to 
enforce such terms as procedurally and substantively unconscionable, 
but it did so after an extensive analysis of facts and arguments by the 
parties that made the decision particularly complex81 and that 
explored the limits of the unconscionability doctrine.82 
Other examples of unconscionable terms can be found in cases 
such as Comb v. PayPal, Inc.,83 with reference to forum selection 
clauses, or Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc.,84 with reference to 
arbitration clauses contained in the “Terms of Service” of websites. 
 
77 See infra Parts IV.–V. 
78 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
79 Id. at 347–48. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 353–54. 
82 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), for a recent analysis 
on the unconscionability of class action waivers in consumer contracts. 
83 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002). In Comb, the court stated that “[a]lthough it 
is true that forum selection clauses generally are presumed prima facie valid, a forum 
selection clause may be unconscionable if the ‘place or manner’ in which arbitration is to 
occur is unreasonable taking into account ‘the respective circumstances of the parties.’” Id. 
at 1177 (citing Bolter v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 894 (2001)). 
84 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
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C. Invasive Terms Unrelated to the Cause of the Contract 
Unconscionable terms present a threat to consumers, but there are 
other types of terms that are more dangerous and even subtler. A 
court might not consider these terms as unconscionable for lack of 
substantive unconscionability, but they are still invasive and create a 
burden on consumers’ privacy and property rights.85 These terms are 
also particularly disturbing because, due to the inadequacy of notice 
described above,86 consumers are unaware of their existence and do 
not realize that their privacy and property rights are being 
constrained. 
In addition to being invasive, these terms are also subtle because 
they are usually unrelated to the cause of the contract offered by the 
businesses providing services to consumers. Using the same real-life 
example as before, it is like getting an ice cream cone for free and 
finding out that you impliedly agreed to have the vendor as a guest in 
your house for the following month. 
Examples of these invasive and unexpected terms can be found in 
most of the contracts offered by major websites that provide their 
services for free, like Google, Twitter, and Facebook. These websites 
have billions of active and passive users87 all over the world. Indeed, 
this makes the problem one that calls for immediate attention. This is 
the first time in the history of contract law that businesses have such a 
large number of customers, and thus, their terms have such an 
enormous impact. 
While the types of invasive and unexpected terms are extremely 
vast and diverse, two particular types of terms are good examples for 
our analysis: those limiting the privacy of consumers, and those 
limiting property rights of consumers over content they post online. 
With reference to the terms limiting privacy of consumers, it is worth 
examining the contractual terms offered by Google regarding 
 
85 These terms may affect other rights of consumers but, for the sake of clarity, I only 
consider two specific types of invasive terms in this Article: the ones intruding over the 
privacy of consumers, and the ones affecting consumers’ property rights with reference to 
the content they post online. 
86 See supra Part II.A. 
87 Active users are those that actively use the website on a regular basis. Passive users 
are those that, after creating an account on the website or using the website one or a few 
times, stopped using the website on a regular basis. It is worth noting that passive users are 
bound to the terms of the contracts offered by the websites mentioned in this Article—
even if they stopped using these websites—as long as they do not formally terminate (if 
possible) those contracts. 
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consumers performing a search on the company’s website. It is 
important to note that these terms apply both to registered and 
unregistered users.88 While analyzing these terms, consider that at the 
time this Article was written, users performed about 45,000 searches 
on Google’s website every second.89 This provides an idea of the 
effect that Google can have on the market and the number of 
consumers that are exposed to the company’s terms daily. 
According to the current legal doctrine of browse-wrap 
agreements, just by performing an Internet search on a website, the 
consumer impliedly, and most likely unknowingly,90 agrees to be 
bound by the website’s contractual terms.91 Google’s terms provide 
that the company is entitled to collect a broad amount of information 
on consumers performing any search,92 such as location,93 search 
 
88 For the purposes of this Article, “unregistered users” are those that have not 
previously created an account with any Google Service. “Registered users” are those that 
have already created accounts with Google Services (e.g., Gmail, YouTube, or Google 
Maps), and they access the search engine while still logged into their Services. 
89 INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/one-second/#google-band 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2014). 
90 See Preston & McCann, supra note 4, at 30 (citing David A. Puckett, Terms of 
Service and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Trap for the Unwary?, 7 OKLA. J. L. & 
TECH. 53 (2011)) (“While the majority of courts continue to suspect that the reasonable 
consumer should know that terms exist, one commentator recently argued that there are 
circumstances in which consumers cannot rationally be expected to fathom that they have 
entered into an agreement by performing certain actions. A prime example of this is the 
Google TOS [terms of service] that purportedly binds all consumers who merely conduct a 
Google search.”). 
91 Google notifies consumers by the presence of a link at the bottom of the webpage 
(“Privacy and Terms”). After clicking that link, the user is directed to a new page 
containing a list of terms available on Google’s website, not the actual text of these terms. 
The user has to then click another link (“Read our terms of service”) to finally access the 
actual terms of the website, which state on the sixth line that, “By using our Services, you 
are agreeing to these terms. Please read them carefully.” This information is current as of 
the drafting of this Article. For more on Google’s Terms of Service, see Google Terms of 
Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last modified Apr. 14, 
2014). 
92 Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/ (last 
modified Dec. 19, 2014) (“We collect information to provide better services to all of our 
users—from figuring out basic stuff like which language you speak, to more complex 
things like which ads you’ll find most useful or the people who matter most to you 
online.” (emphasis omitted)). 
93 Id. (“When you use a location-enabled Google service, we may collect and process 
information about your actual location, like GPS signals sent by a mobile device. We may 
also use various technologies to determine location, such as sensor data from your device 
that may, for example, provide information on nearby Wi-Fi access points and cell 
towers.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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queries, and device details.94 Furthermore, Google does not limit this 
tracking activity to when the consumer is visiting its website; it also 
sends and stores a small file (a “cookie”)95 on consumers’ computers 
that will track them during their visits to every other website not 
owned or controlled by Google but that uses Google’s technology.96 
An example may help in understanding the reach of the tracking 
activity performed by Google and the limits imposed on consumers’ 
privacy. When I, for the purpose of research, visited a website that I 
had never visited before via a direct link,97 and which was completely 
unrelated to my scholarly, professional, or personal interests, that 
website displayed advertisements unrelated to its content but 
impressively related to previous searches or online browsing activities 
that I performed days before this visit. This happened because the 
previously-visited website most likely uses Google AdSense98 to 
display advertisements on its pages and to monetize its content. The 
cookie that had been stored on my computer by Google the first time I 
visited the search engine has been tracking and profiling me for a long 
time, allowing third-party websites to display advertisements 
perfectly tailored to my interests. This largely benefits the third-party 
websites, because by displaying these tailored advertisements, it is 
 
94 Id. (“When you use our services or view content provided by Google, we may 
automatically collect and store certain information in server logs. This may include: details 
of how you used our service, such as your search queries, . . . device event information 
such as crashes, system activity, hardware settings, browser type, browser language, the 
date and time of your request and referral URL.” (emphasis omitted)). 
95 Id. (“We and our partners use various technologies to collect and store information 
when you visit a Google service, and this may include sending one or more cookies or 
anonymous identifiers to your device. We also use cookies and anonymous identifiers 
when you interact with services we offer to our partners, such as advertising services or 
Google features that may appear on other sites.” (emphasis omitted)). 
96 Some of the Google technology that websites use include, for example, Google 
Analytics to keep track of users and get information such as user locations, their operative 
system, and their computer; Google Webmaster, which allows websites to be properly 
listed in Google; and YouTube, which allows websites to embed its videos on their pages. 
97 I visited the website without going through Google or any other referral website. This 
occurs when a user types in the exact address of the website she intends to visit, for 
example, www.apple.com. 
98 Google AdSense gives publishers in the Google Network the opportunity to monetize 
their websites by displaying automatic text, images, videos, or interactive media 
advertisements that are targeted to site content and audiences. Google AdSense is a big 
source of revenue for the company. In the first quarter of 2014, Google earned $3.4 billion 
($13.6 billion annualized), or 22% of total revenue, through Google AdSense. See Press 
Release, Google, Google Inc. Announces First Quarter 2014 Results (Apr. 16, 2014), 
available at http://investor.google.com/earnings/2014/Q1_google_earnings.html. 
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more likely that I will click on them, and this will generate a profit for 
the website.99 However, the profits represent an invasion of my 
privacy, allegedly authorized by me via Google’s contractual terms. 
In addition to being invasive, these terms are also unexpected 
because they are unrelated to the scope of the contract that consumers 
unknowingly enter into. Consumers use Google’s services to perform 
Internet searches. There is no correlation between this use and scope 
and the need to continuously track consumers after the search has 
been performed. Profiling and tailored advertisements are not what a 
reasonable consumer would expect from a contract that regulates an 
Internet search. 
The second type of invasive terms is one generally included in 
most contracts offered by popular social networks, such as Twitter, 
Facebook, or Instagram. By way of these contracts, consumers give 
the websites a broad license to use any content the user posts on that 
website, i.e., photos, text, or video. This license allows the websites to 
use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, 
display, and distribute consumers’ content in any and all media or 
distribution methods now known or later developed.100 Some 
websites, such as Facebook, include terms that allow the site to use 
content posted by consumers on their platforms, including profile 
pictures and names, with paid commercials displayed on the same 
platform.101 
 
99 Websites receive a fee each time a visitor clicks the advertisement posted—this is 
usually referred to as CPC (“cost-per-click”). Cost-per-Click (CPC), GOOGLE, 
https://support .google.com/adwords/answer/116495?hl=en (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
100 For example, Twitter’s “Terms of Service” include the following statement:  
You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through 
the Services. By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the 
Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the 
right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, 
transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution 
methods (now known or later developed). 
Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (effective Sept. 8, 2014). 
101 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com 
/legal/terms (last revised Nov. 15, 2013) (“Our goal is to deliver advertising and other 
commercial or sponsored content that is valuable to our users and advertisers. In order to 
help us do that, you agree to the following: [Y]ou give us permission to use your name, 
profile picture, content, and information in connection with commercial, sponsored, or 
related content (such as a brand you like) served or enhanced by us. This means, for 
example, that you permit a business or other entity to pay us to display your name and/or 
profile picture with your content or information, without any compensation to you. If you 
have selected a specific audience for your content or information, we will respect your 
choice when we use it.”). 
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Of course, these websites need to obtain some sort of copyright 
license from their customers to display users’ content online. And a 
good faith interpretation of these terms would suggest that such a 
broad license is needed to display content in an ever changing tech 
environment. For example, in the future, Twitter may launch a new 
way to deliver users’ messages, such as a new app or a new website. 
A broad license allows this company to continue delivering its 
services with no need to return to the consumers to obtain an 
additional license for the new product. 
However, a more skeptical interpreter would argue that these terms 
are too broad, and that these websites should draft them narrowly, 
limiting the use of content to that specific website and only within the 
context of the website’s main features at the time the content has been 
posted by its users. The final result is one in which any consumer 
posting content online on one of these platforms should assume that 
the platform might use that content in any way possible. 
Additionally, these terms are unexpected. When a consumer posts 
content online, he or she wants to share it on that specific platform 
with its users. There is no correlation between this limited scope and 
the need to obtain a broad license to use the consumer’s content in 
any way the company may deem feasible. When a user posts a picture 
of his family on Facebook, he wants Facebook to distribute it to his 
friends. The user does not expect Facebook to use the same picture 
for commercials or to profile the user for tailored advertisement. 
Businesses such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter see profiling 
their customers as the main monetization solution for their platforms. 
Consumers assume that these services are free, but in reality, users are 
paying a price for the services received—their privacy and their 
property rights. This Article does not maintain that websites such as 
the ones mentioned should not properly monetize their services. The 
scope of this Article suggests reforming the regulation of contracts 
online such that consumers will be made aware of the terms of use of 
these websites. Consumers should be able to decide whether privacy 
and property rights are a price worth paying for the continued use of 
the websites. 
D. Social Pressure 
In addition to the above-mentioned problems, online contracts add 
a new layer of complexity to the traditional adhesion contracts that 
already create social pressure on consumers by inducing them to sign 
GHIRARDELLI (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  12:05 PM 
742 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 719 
contracts quickly.102 Online contracts provide a new type of social 
pressure that influences consumers before and after the contract has 
been formed. 
The major social networks and search engines are extremely 
popular among consumers, and they become more appealing with a 
high number of users. This not only creates a traditional incentive to 
use these websites, but it transforms the incentive to psychological 
need. Somehow, these websites create new languages, uniquely 
spoken by their users. If consumers do not want to be socially 
marginalized, they need to learn this language, and the only way to do 
so is to start using these websites. This surely happens to more 
vulnerable and susceptible consumers such as teens and young adults. 
However, the broad-scale adoption of these websites renders this 
scenario dangerous even to less vulnerable consumers such as adults. 
Social pressure lowers the attention span of consumers and, together 
with the inadequate notice required by the current doctrine of browse-
wrap agreements,103 makes it even more unlikely that consumers will 
be aware of the existence or content of any contractual term. 
This social pressure does not only affect consumers merely before 
the formation of the contract, but it also affects them after the contract 
has been formed when they eventually want to terminate the contract 
and close their account on the website. This applies more to social 
networks than to websites such as Google; social networks facilitate 
networking, and terminating an account means losing all the contacts 
made on that network. 
Reforming the rules of online contract formation and providing 
consumers with proper notice of contractual terms would help 
enhance the attention span of consumers affected by social pressure. 
III 
SOLUTIONS PROPOSED SO FAR 
Scholars and courts have debated for years the fairness of the rules 
on contract formation in adhesion contracts and online contracts. 
Many solutions and approaches have been suggested, but none of 
them seem to be premised on a clear understanding of the complexity 
of the problem. Nor do these solutions strike the right balance 
 
102 Social pressure usually happens because consumers are concerned that careful 
reading of the terms might be considered confrontational or simply rude. Barnes, supra 
note 4, at 260. 
103 See supra Part II.A. 
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between businesses’ need for fluid contract formation and consumers’ 
need for adequate notice. Before illustrating the standard that this 
Article suggests, it is important to analyze some of the most intriguing 
solutions that have been suggested so far by courts and scholars, as 
well as their limits. 
A. The Unconscionability Doctrine 
Terms in traditional adhesion and online contracts are usually 
scrutinized under section 2-302 of the UCC. While this provision 
should apply to sales contracts only, courts also broadly apply it to 
non-sales contracts. UCC section 2-302(1) provides that: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of  the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the 
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the 
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it 
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to 
avoid any unconscionable result.104 
This subsection does not provide a definition of “unconscionable” 
terms. Over the years, courts and scholars have filled this gap by 
creating the unconscionability doctrine. This doctrine has both a 
procedural and substantive component. 
Courts consider a term procedurally unconscionable when, after 
analyzing a variety of factors, it finds that there was a lack of mutual 
assent and no meeting of the minds of the parties.105 The factors that 
courts usually consider are age, literacy, sophistication of the parties, 
the manner and setting in which the contract was formed, and whether 
the weaker party had a reasonable opportunity to review and 
understand the terms, among others.106 
Substantive unconscionability is found when the contract contains 
unfair terms, such that “a contract term is one-sided and will have an 
overly harsh effect on the disadvantaged party.”107 In deciding 
whether terms are substantively unconscionable, courts usually 
consider factors such as the commercial reasonableness of the 
 
104 U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2012). 
105 New v. GameStop, Inc., 753 S.E.2d 62, 66 (W. Va. 2013). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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contract terms, the purpose and effect of the terms, the allocation of 
the risks between the parties, and public policy concerns.108 
While the unconscionability doctrine has helped consumers defend 
their rights against harsh contract terms, the same doctrine has three 
limits with reference to online contracts. First, the current 
interpretation of substantive and procedural unconscionability suffers 
from a fragmentation of the doctrine as endorsed and applied by 
different courts.109 This same problem is reflected in the 
interpretation of the relationship between substantive and procedural 
unconscionability.110 
Second, only a court’s intervention, usually initiated by consumers, 
can trigger the unconscionability doctrine, which will eventually 
produce its effects only after an analysis of the specific factual 
circumstances of the contract, on a case-by-case basis. Some scholars 
have considered this doctrine a shield more than a sword in the battle 
for the protection of consumers’ interests.111 This solution is not 
 
108 State ex rel. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Webster, 752 S.E.2d 372, 377 (W. Va. 
2013). 
109 See BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 21:142 (2014). 
110 Unfortunately, unconscionability rules are applied differently from state to state. In 
California, for example, the party raising an unconscionability claim must prove both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability; the two prongs of the test operate on a 
sliding scale, in which the more the party proves one prong, the less significant the other 
prong becomes. Procedural unconscionability is shown under California law when the 
standard term is imposed and drafted by the strongest party, and it requires the subscribing 
party to take it or leave it. See id.; see also Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 
1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 A different approach is the one adopted by New York courts, in which a party need only 
prove substantive unconscionability in some cases. At the same time, this jurisdiction 
provides that courts should consider an ample spectrum of factors when deciding whether 
a term is procedurally unconscionable, such as whether one party lacked any meaningful 
choice in entering into the contract, whether the party claiming unconscionability is 
experienced and educated, whether the contract contained fine print, and whether the 
offeror used “high pressure tactics” when proposing the contract. Brower v. Gateway 
2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 248–53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
 Finally, a different approach is the one adopted by courts in Washington and Illinois, in 
which substantive unconscionability and procedural unconscionability are considered two 
different defenses. See M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 
314–16 (Wash. 2000); see also In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 
631341, at *5–7 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000). 
111 The analogy of the unconscionability doctrine as a shield is inspiring, and it 
highlights why this doctrine is not considered sufficiently aggressive to be considered a 
sword. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and 
Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 229 (2000) (“The unconscionability doctrine, 
famously, operates as a shield and not as a sword. One may protect oneself against 
enforcement of an unconscionable contract, but one may not obtain damages for having 
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efficient, and individual consumers cannot solve the problems of 
online contracts through individual cases. 
Third, while the unconscionability doctrine may partially protect 
consumers’ interests when timely triggered and properly interpreted 
by courts, this doctrine may not be able to protect consumers from 
invasive and unexpected terms.112 It is doubtful whether a court 
would consider terms such as the ones included by Google and 
Twitter113 as overly harsh and substantively unconscionable. At the 
same time, the damages that these invasive terms may cause to 
consumers can be even worse than the ones that consumers may 
suffer from other traditionally unconscionable terms. 
These three limits render the unconscionability doctrine an 
inefficient solution to the problems faced by consumers in online 
contracts. The proposal included in this Article aims to provide clarity 
to UCC section 2-302. The proposed rule is triggered at the time of 
contract formation and ensures adequate notice of the rights and 
obligations of consumers arising under the contract.114 
B. Informed Consumers 
Some scholars believe that the advent of the Internet has created a 
completely new category of consumers, the so-called “informed 
consumers” or “Twenty-First Century consumers.”115 These scholars 
emphasize that the Internet is an information superhighway, and that 
each consumer can easily find online information regarding any 
product. These consumers should be more aware of contractual terms 
than pre-Internet consumers, and they should be able to access a 
higher amount of data before making their purchase decisions. 
This idea portrays consumers in the digital age as aggressive actors 
having similar bargaining power to that of businesses. These 
consumers could use their knowledge and information to willingly 
accept the risk of boilerplate contracts as a way to obtain benefits 
 
been subject to an unconscionable offer; nor may one seek restitution for compliance with 
an unconscionable contract.”). 
112 See supra Part II.C. 
113 See supra Part II.C. 
114 See infra Part V. 
115 Trakman provides an excellent excursus through some of the leading scholars’ 
works on the idea of a new type of consumer, highly informed and able to bargain with 
businesses at almost the same level of power. Adhesion Contracts, supra note 3, at 16–19; 
see also Boundaries of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 194–96. 
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from businesses. And they would do so, for instance, by instigating 
other consumers to endorse a copycat behavior, or by bringing class 
action lawsuits against websites for imposing unconscionable or 
invasive terms on them. 
This theory is not realistic. It is true that consumers nowadays are 
more informed than they were before, given that they have access to 
information sources before completing a purchase order (e.g., 
customers can read reviews posted by hundreds of users on Amazon 
or they can check reviews of businesses on Yelp). But while this 
information can help consumers choose products and services, it is 
very unlikely that it will also help them understand the terms of 
contracts offered by different websites. There are currently no 
comprehensive websites that offer reviews of contractual terms. Such 
a website would also probably be difficult to create, and it would not 
be able to cover many different possible scenarios. In addition, social 
pressure116 surely lowers the attention span and aggressiveness even 
of the most informed consumer. Therefore, we are far from all being 
informed consumers that do not need any protection from the abusive 
practices of online businesses. 
C. Situational Duress Versus Aberrant Mass Consumer Electronic 
Contracts 
Another scholar, Professor Nancy Kim, has strongly criticized 
every ‘wrap agreement, and she has described mass consumer 
electronic contracts as “aberrant.”117 This approach to online 
contracts has generated a theory of consumer defense against the 
abuse of businesses that finds inspiration in extreme contract defense 
theories, such as duress. 
As generally known, duress is defined as any wrongful act or threat 
that overcomes the free will of a party.118 Kim’s idea is to transfer 
this concept to electronic contracts and to find a way to define the 
 
116 See supra Part II.D. 
117 See generally Nancy S. Kim, Situational Duress and the Aberrance of Electronic 
Contracts, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265 (2014). The main reasons why Kim considers 
electronic contracts as aberrant are the same as those highlighted in previous Sections of 
this Article. In particular, Kim underlines how “[c]ompanies intentionally minimize the 
disruptiveness of contract presentment in order to facilitate transactions and to create a 
smooth website experience for the consumer. All of this reduces the signaling effect of 
contracts and deters consumers from reading terms. . . . Companies take advantage of 
consumer failure to read and include ever more aggressive and oppressive terms.” Id. at 
265–66. 
118 See id. 
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wrongful act or threat in a digital form.119 The result of this approach 
is the creation of the doctrine of situational duress120 as a defense to 
electronic contract formation. Under the doctrine, such a defense may 
be validly raised “if (1) a drafting company uses an electronic 
contract to block consumer access to a product or service; (2) the 
consumer has a ‘vested interest’ in that product or service; and (3) the 
consumer accepts the terms because she was blocked from the 
product or service after attempting to reject or decline them.”121 This 
approach has three main limits, two of which are related to the 
specific standard that it proposes, and the third is more generally 
related to the nature of the standard. 
First, while the idea of transferring the doctrine of duress to the 
online scenario and transmuting it into this new doctrine of situational 
duress is definitely interesting, the standard considerably limits its 
applicability.122 The first prong of the test refers to cases in which the 
drafting party—the business—uses an electronic contract to block 
consumers’ access to a product or service. This prong basically 
describes websites that require consumers to agree to a contract 
before using the website’s services. The standard would not apply to 
some of the examples of terms that have been presented in this Article 
(e.g., Twitter’s terms on content’s license),123 given that these terms 
are usually included in web services accessible by users without the 
need to formally agree to any contract. More specifically, this 
standard would not apply to terms that limit privacy, like those 
offered by Google. 
Second, the idea of  “vested interest” as explained by the author of 
the doctrine124 has a similarly limited applicability. Kim states that 
“vested interest” would occur with a consumer in a “rolling 
 
119 See id. at 266. 
120 Traditional duress and situational duress would also have some differences when 
applying this doctrine. Id. (“Unlike traditional duress, a finding of situational duress would 
render a contract void and not merely voidable.”). 
121 Id. at 279. 
122 Kim recognizes it has limited applicability. See id. at 278 (“The recognition of a 
situational duress defense would be limited to situations where consumers are uniquely 
vulnerable because of the nature of their interest in the relevant product or service. In other 
words, situational duress does not encompass all electronic contracting scenarios.”). 
123 See supra Part II.C. 
124 Id. at 279–81. 
GHIRARDELLI (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  12:05 PM 
748 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 719 
contract,”125 or “content hostage” scenario.126 This basically limits 
the test to shrink-wrap agreements or agreements offered by other 
companies that invite consumers to store their documents on their 
services, such as Dropbox. This could theoretically keep these 
documents as hostages if the user does not agree to additional terms. 
Again, this would leave the terms used in our previous examples 
completely untouched. 
Moreover, this test would face some of the limits already discussed 
in this Article with reference to the unconscionability doctrine,127 
given that situational duress would only be applied  as a defense in 
court, and thus, would require consumers to trigger it by filing claims 
after the contract has already been formed. Finally, Kim’s approach 
seems to alienate online agreements, focusing too much on the 
consumers’ side of the transaction. 
The biggest challenge here is to find a new balance between 
businesses and consumers without abandoning online contracts. The 
suggested solution takes into account the need for businesses to have 
a simple process to meet contract formation requirements without 
affecting usability of their websites and the need for consumers to be 
properly informed about the existence and nature of contractual terms. 
D. American Law Institute Proposal 
While the doctrine of unconscionability remains the main defense 
for consumers in online contracts, there has been a significant attempt 
to propose an alternative solution. In 1979, the American Law 
Institute (ALI) adopted a provision intended to regulate standard 
forms and limit the risks to consumers arising from these contracts.128 
While this proposal does not specifically address online contracts—
having been drafted way before the advent of the Internet—its 
 
125 Id.; see also Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 744 
(2002) (“In a rolling contract, a consumer orders and pays for goods before seeing most of 
the terms, which are contained on or in the packaging of the goods.”). 
126 See Kim, supra note 117, at 279–80 (“The second scenario involves ‘content 
hostage’ and occurs when the consumer uses a service that, either with or without a fee, 
permits consumers to store content on the company’s servers. . . . Email providers and 
social media or ‘sharing’ sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram fall into this 
category . . . . A user typically registers and agrees to the terms of an electronic contract 
prior to being permitted to upload content. After registration and when the user has already 
stored content on the website, these companies may update their terms and require their 
users to accept before being allowed to continue using the service.”). 
127 See supra Part III.A. 
128 Barnes, supra note 4, at 231. 
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analysis is helpful to understand the effectiveness of similar 
proposals. 
In particular, the ALI suggested adopting a new method to balance 
the interests of businesses and consumers. This attempt was codified 
in section 211(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which 
states the following: “Where the other party has reason to believe that 
the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the 
writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the 
agreement.”129 This proposal addresses the lack of mutual assent that 
is typical of traditional adhesion contracts and implicitly ignores the 
criticized duty to read doctrine.130 
Section 211(3) has been highly criticized.131 Professor James J. 
White, for example, expressed his concern that this rule might lead to 
testimonial abuse because section 211(3) adopts a subjective 
interpretation of the contract and its terms.132 On one hand, to 
successfully challenge the contract, the consumer would have to 
prove that he would not have manifested assent to the contract if he 
knew that a particular contract term was present.133 On the other 
hand, the business would be able to defend its position by proving 
that it was not aware of the specific intent of the consumer.134 
Professor W. David Slawson offers another critique of this 
subsection, arguing that the attempt by the ALI does not provide any 
real solution to consumers because of the nature of adhesion 
contracts.135 These contracts are adopted by businesses with reference 
to multitudes of consumers. Thus, it is extremely unlikely that these 
businesses will have information on the subjective status of each 
consumer. In addition, Slawson emphasizes that section 211(3) does 
not cover cases in which consumers do not appreciate the significance 
of the contractual term at the time of the contract’s execution.136 
Section 211(3) generated many other critiques amongst scholars.137 
 
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981). 
130 See cases cited supra note 22. 
131 See generally Barnes, supra note 4 (providing an excellent analysis of the positive 
and negative aspects of the ALI proposal). 
132 James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 
315, 323–24 (1997). 
133 Id. at 320. 
134 Cf. id. at 323–24. 
135 New Meaning of Contract, supra note 4, at 61–63. 
136 See id. at 62. 
137 See generally Barnes, supra note 4, for other arguments against section 211(3). 
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While ALI’s proposal provides an interesting approach to the 
issues related to adhesion contracts, and while some scholars have 
attempted to defend the qualities of this subsection and argued for its 
adoption and use in current contract law,138 this proposal has limits 
that make it incapable of solving the problems of formation of online 
contracts. 
The limits are twofold. First, the proposal focuses too much on the 
subjective aspect of contractual intent and the awareness of 
businesses and consumers on a case-by-case basis. This focus would 
require the court to conduct a careful analysis of the circumstances 
surrounding the formation of the contract, and it would become very 
difficult to meet this burden of proof. Second, this theory shares the 
same limits of the unconscionability doctrine,139 since only individual 
consumers challenging the enforceability of a contract in court would 
trigger its use. 
E. Market Regulation 
Several attempts have been made to solve the issues related to 
contract formation through market regulation. One of the most 
interesting proposals has been the “Do Not Track” project.140 This 
project aimed to solve the issue of websites tracking users around the 
Internet, with the intent to profile them and display targeted 
advertisements.141 
The initial idea was to create a Do Not Track list for online 
advertising that would be managed by the Federal Trade 
Commission.142 The Do Not Track movement captured the interest of 
web users. In July 2009, two researchers created a prototype add-on 
for one of the most popular Internet browsers at that time, Mozilla 
Firefox.143 Users were able to use this add-on to communicate to the 
 
138 Barnes, supra note 4, at 262–63 (“The law should adopt a rule that more accurately 
addresses both consumers’ cognitive limitations and the tendency of business entities to 
exploit those limitations.”). 
139 See supra Part III.A. 
140 See generally Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: 
Advancing Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 281 (2012). 
141 See id. at 284. 
142 Id. at 322–23. 
143 See Christopher Soghoian, The History of the Do Not Track Header, SLIGHT 
PARANOIA (Jan. 21, 2011), http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2011/01/history-of-do-not-track       
-header.html. 
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world their intent to opt-out from any tracking activity by advertising 
companies.144 
The Do Not Track project faced a problem that was common of 
market regulation efforts. These efforts work only if the actors in a 
specific field join forces to adopt the solutions proposed. In particular, 
the Do Not Track add-on would have worked only if websites were 
coded to respect users’ desires, expressed by turning the add-on on or 
off. Unfortunately, the project never received a broad adoption, and it 
never affected the market apart from the important role in sensitizing 
consumers and lawmakers on privacy issues online.145 The business 
model most commonly used by online services is to profile users as 
much as possible and use this information to deliver ads. Business 
owners may not want to listen to consumers’ desires to not be tracked, 
and they do not want to limit their profiling activities; this is like 
hoping that lions will not eat a gazelle if the latter wears a “do not eat 
me” t-shirt. 
Another interesting market regulation proposal has been suggested 
by the Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions 
(AFFECT).146 This group originally was created to seek changes in 
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).147 
After the debate on UCITA dried up, the group focused on drafting 
twelve contract principles that would help consumers regain their 
contractual power and determination.148 The idea was to educate 
consumers on the effects of contractual terms and to incentivize 
businesses to adopt terms more respectful of consumers’ rights and 
interests.149 Unfortunately, this project had a similar fate of the Do 
Not Track proposal, and it never succeeded in effectively changing 
the way online contracts are formed. 
The problem with market regulation efforts is the existence of 
vested interests and the difficulty in having the main players of this 
market comply with proposals that will limit their benefits and profits. 
 
144 Id. 
145 For an analysis of the future of the Do Not Track project, see Tene & Polonetsky, 
supra note 140, at 332–35. 
146 For a complete analysis of the principles introduced by AFFECT, see Robert L. 
Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated 
Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1071–1100 (2005). 
147 Who We Are, AFFECT, http://www.ucita.com/who.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
148 See generally Oakley, supra note 146, at 1072–73. 
149 Id. 
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As expressed in the following Sections150 of this Article, the only 
hope for consumers is legislative intervention, reform to the current 
doctrine, and rules that take into account the need of consumers to be 
properly informed of contractual terms and their need to determine 
their rights and obligations. 
IV 
THE INSPIRATION FOR THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
As noted previously,151 the current doctrine of traditional adhesion 
contracts and online contracts152 has limits that create an imbalance 
between businesses and consumers in which businesses enjoy an 
enormous advantage over consumers. Further, claims and strategies 
available to consumers to protect their interests are limited, and the 
current legal doctrines do not offer proper tools to correct this 
imbalance.153 
The problems are caused by the following issues, which need to be 
properly addressed: 
(i) The uncertainty and fragmentation of the meaning of 
substantive unconscionability and, more specifically, the lack of a 
codified determination of unconscionable terms. This circumstance 
does not facilitate transactions and creates a grey area that can be 
leveraged by businesses;154 
(ii) The uncertainty and narrow definition of procedural 
unconscionability and the fragmented interpretation of the 
relationship between this factor and substantive 
unconscionability;155 
(iii) The inadequacy of the current notice standard endorsed by 
courts with respect to browse-wrap agreements;156 
(iv) The lack of any provision that refers to invasive and 
unexpected terms;157and 
 
150 See infra Part V. 
151 See supra Part III. 
152 This term is used in this Article to consider each and every kind of online contract, 
including click-wrap and browse-wrap contracts. Given the fluidity of technology and the 
rapid evolution of the Internet, a paper that aims to provide a solution to the imbalance of 
interests between businesses and consumers should consider these contracts in general, 
focusing on their common grounds, and not on their minimal differences. Doing so would 
provide a solution that can fit any online contract, the ones currently adopted by the 
majority of businesses, and the ones that may be created in the future. 
153 See supra Part III. 
154 See supra Part III.A. 
155 See supra note 110. 
156 See supra Part II.A. 
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(v)  The need for a solution that is going to be triggered before 
contract formation and that changes the current idea that a term is 
valid unless a court declares it unconscionable. A term, on the 
contrary, should be invalid, unless it is in compliance with new 
rules of contract formation for online contracts.158 
The goal of this Article is to provide a uniform solution to the 
issues outlined above. This solution would allow businesses to 
continue benefitting from the mitigated rules of contract formation 
under the doctrines of adhesion contracts and online contracts. At the 
same time, this solution would allow consumers proper and timely 
notification of contractual terms that may deeply affect their rights 
and contractual position.159 
Inspiration for the proposed solution comes from foreign legal 
systems and doctrines. The European system is especially considered 
for its ample regulation of consumers’ rights. The purpose of this 
Article is not to suggest the adoption of such regulations, but to 
understand how these regulations and doctrines may help us craft 
rules of engagement regarding the conflict in online contracts 
between businesses and consumers. 
A. The European Directive on Abusive Terms 
The U.S. legal system has specific rules that deal with consumer 
protection.160 But with reference to the construction and enforcement 
 
157 See supra Part II.C. 
158 See supra Part III.A. 
159 See Nancy S. Kim, ‘Wrap Contracts and Privacy (Ass’n for the Advancement of 
Artificial Intelligence, No. Technical Report SS-10-05, 2010). Here, the author correctly 
underlines that “[b]ecause the user/licensor is the party granting the website a license to 
use its personal information, the online agreement should be structured to require the user 
to actively assent to indicate the nature and scope of that license.” Id. at 3. 
160 See Winn & Bix, supra note 31, at 181–82, for a more extensive presentation of this 
issue. In particular, it is interesting to see how there is a difference on the role that, 
according to the U.S. and European system, government should have in regulating 
markets. Id. at 183–84. In the United States, the idea of market-driven regulation is 
stronger than government regulation, while in the EU this approach has not been broadly 
embraced, and the general consensus is that government should intervene in providing 
consumers’ protection by enacting consumer-driven regulations. This may be the reason 
why current doctrines in the United States are not capable of finding the right balance 
between businesses and consumers. It is true that consumers may leverage the information 
readily available on the Internet to make informed choices about the contracts they enter 
into with businesses. But it is also true that—as previously stated in Part III of this 
Article—it is very likely that other factors, such as social pressure, strength of businesses 
online, etc., will play a fundamental role in deciding whether the current American 
approach of general deference to private initiative should be maintained or whether the 
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of contracts, the same rules that apply to transactions between 
businesses also apply to transactions between businesses and 
consumers.161 
Europe takes a different approach to the construction and 
enforcement of contracts. In the past two decades, the European 
Union has been very active in the area of consumer protection and has 
enacted a series of directives aimed at regulating consumer 
contracts.162 This approach has been part of a harmonization process 
aimed at adopting uniform rules, ensuring a minimum level of 
consumer protection.163 While these regulations do not specifically 
target adhesion contracts or online contracts, they apply to any 
contract involving consumers.164 Therefore, the same rules apply to 
adhesion contracts and online contracts, as long as consumers are 
parties to these contracts. 
Directive 93/13 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (the 
“Directive”) is the most interesting regulation for the purposes of our 
study.165 The Council of the European Community adopted the 
 
system should come closer to the EU approach, which is aimed to meet high levels of 
consumer protection through regulation and harmonization. 
161 See id. 
162 The most relevant ones are, together with the Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts (broadly analyzed in the following pages of this Article): Council 
Directive 97/7 on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. 
(L 144) 4, 6 (EC) (the Distance Selling Directive, which regulated transactions between 
remote merchants and consumers, when the contract is offered on television, through 
telemarketing, on the Internet, or through other electronic communication channels) and 
the EU Electronic Commerce Directive 2000/31, O.J. (L 178) 17, 7 (EC) (establishing 
harmonized rules on issues related to transparency and accountability in online 
commerce). 
163 See generally Aristides N. Hatzis, An Offer You Cannot Negotiate: Some Thoughts 
on the Economics of Standard Form Consumer Contracts, in STANDARD CONTRACT 
TERMS IN EUROPE: A BASIS FOR AND A CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 43 
(Hugh Collins, ed. 2008). 
164 See id. at 44. 
165 This is not the first time that the EU Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts has been considered as an inspiration for reforming the rules of contract 
formation. See Oakley, supra note 146, at 1065–66. Professor Oakley’s article shares with 
this Article some of the concerns related to contract formation, but it mainly focuses on 
software licenses and the issues related to shrink-wrap and click-wrap contracts. The 
different focus of the analysis between Professor Oakley’s article and this Article is 
justified by a shift in the adoption of ‘wrap contracts online. While at the time of Professor 
Oakley’s article the main concern was End User License Agreements included in software 
contracts, today the main concern is browse-wrap contracts, due to their massive adoption 
and effects on consumers. When Professor Oakley wrote his article, some of the websites 
mentioned here (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram) did not exist, or they were still at 
their early stages of development. For example, Facebook had only 6 million users in 
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Directive on April 5, 1993, and it was intended to address businesses 
ever growing use of unfair and abusive contractual terms that damage 
consumers.166 Specifically, the Directive’s goal is to protect 
consumers from abusive and unfair terms included in contracts 
without their consent, to provide a non-exhaustive list of abusive and 
unfair terms common in these types of contracts, and to disincentivize 
the adoption of oppressive terms in contracts with consumers.167 
While the Directive addresses “abusive and unfair” contractual 
terms, the definition of these terms, per the text of the Directive, is 
similar to the definition of unconscionable terms adopted by our 
system. This similarity suggests that the Directive, and the solutions 
there offered, might help us solve the issues arising from uncertainty 
in the scope of the substantive and procedural unconscionability 
doctrine. 
The European legislature has adopted a clear definition of unfair 
and abusive terms. In contrast, UCC section 2-302 only states: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the 
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the 
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it 
 
2005. Ami Sedghi, Facebook: 10 Years of Social Networking, in Numbers, GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 4, 2014, 9:38 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/feb/04/face 
book-in-numbers-statistics. This number has significantly increased in the following years, 
and the popular social network reached 1.23 billion users at the end of 2013. Id. With 
reference, in particular, to the analysis of the impact that the European Directive on Unfair 
Terms may have on our system, Professor Oakley’s article differs from this one. Professor 
Oakley covered some of the benefits offered by the Directive, but he believed that such an 
approach would have been difficult to adopt in our country because of vested interests that 
would resist. See Oakley, supra note 146, at 1070. Professor Oakley then considered the 
efforts of AFFECTS and its proposal of twelve principles that should have been adopted in 
electronic transactions to protect consumers’ interests. While I share with Professor 
Oakley the concern about difficulties in the adoption in our system of some of the 
solutions introduced by the EU Directive, I believe that market regulation solutions, such 
as the one proposed by AFFECTS, will not likely succeed because of the vested interests 
cited by Professor Oakley. The broad adoption of browse-wrap agreements and the 
predatory practices by businesses require a stronger intervention, such that only the 
legislature can provide. As illustrated in Part VI, this Article suggests that only a reform of 
UCC section 2-302, or the enactment of new rules inspired by the principles described 
here, will have a chance to shift the current doctrine of online contract formation to an 
approach more favorable to consumers. 
166 Hatzis, supra note 163, at 44. 
167 Id. 
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may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to 
avoid any unconscionable result.168 
As indicated before,169 this provision does not clarify the meaning 
of the term “unconscionable,” and courts have to fill in the gaps by 
providing a fragmented interpretation of this term. On the other hand, 
under Article 3.1, the Directive provides the general criteria to define 
unfair terms: “A contractual term which has not been individually 
negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement 
of good faith, it causes significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the 
consumer.”170 Article 3.1 clarifies the meaning of unfair terms. If a 
term causes significant imbalance and the imbalance causes a 
detriment to consumers, then the term is “unfair.” 
While Article 3.1 defines the meaning of unfair terms, the 
Directive also provides a list of terms that the European Council 
considers unfair.171 When a contractual term matches one of the types 
 
168 U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2012). 
169 See supra Part II.B. 
170 Council Directive 93/13/EEC, on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, art. 3.1, 
1993 O.J. (L 95). 
171 The Directive’s Annex includes “Terms Referred to in Article [3.2].” Id. These 
terms have the object or effect of: 
 (a) excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event 
of the death of a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or 
omission of that seller or supplier; 
 (b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-
à-vis the seller or supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-
performance or inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the 
contractual obligations, including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the 
seller or supplier against any claim which the consumer may have against him; 
 (c) making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of 
services by the seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose realization 
depends on his own will alone; 
 (d) permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer 
where the latter decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without 
providing for the consumer to receive compensation of an equivalent amount 
from the seller or supplier where the latter is the party cancelling the contract; 
 (e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfill his obligation to pay a 
disproportionately high sum in compensation; 
 (f) authorizing the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a 
discretionary basis where the same facility is not granted to the consumer, or 
permitting the seller or supplier to retain the sums paid for services not yet 
supplied by him where it is the seller or supplier himself who dissolves the 
contract; 
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included in the list, it will be considered unfair with no need to prove 
the requirements of Article 3.1. 
This list avoids the confusion that fragmented case law has 
generated in our system in interpreting the meaning of 
“unconscionable.” The difference is striking. While our system 
requires that courts assess contractual terms and their 
unconscionability on a case-by-case basis, the list and definitions 
provided by the Directive guarantee certainty and uniformity. 
Businesses are on notice that any term within the list is assumed to be 
unfair and, thus, invalid. It is also important to note that the 
 
 (g) enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate 
duration without reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for 
doing so; 
 (h) automatically extending a contract of fixed duration where the consumer 
does not indicate otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express 
this desire not to extend the contract is unreasonably early; 
 (i) irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real 
opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract; 
 (j) enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally 
without a valid reason which is specified in the contract; 
 (k) enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason 
any characteristics of the product or service to be provided; 
 (l) providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery 
or allowing a seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price 
without in both cases giving the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the 
contract if the final price is too high in relation to the price agreed when the 
contract was concluded; 
 (m) giving the seller or supplier the right to determine whether the goods or 
services supplied are in conformity with the contract, or giving him the exclusive 
right to interpret any term of the contract; 
 (n) limiting the seller’s or supplier’s obligation to respect commitments 
undertaken by his agents or making his commitments subject to compliance with 
a particular formality; 
 (o) obliging the consumer to [fulfill] all his obligations where the seller or 
supplier does not perform his; 
 (p) giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and 
obligations under the contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for 
the consumer, without the latter’s agreement; 
 (q) excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action or 
exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take 
disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly 
restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof 
which, according to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the 
contract. 
Id. 
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codification of the meaning of the term “unfair” does not limit its 
applicability in the future, given that the Directive’s list is not 
exhaustive, and courts in Europe are free to find additional unfair 
terms. Moreover, comparing the Directive to our doctrine may shed 
light on the doctrine of procedural unconscionability and its 
relationship to substantive unconscionability.172 
The UCC is silent on procedural unconscionability, a territory of 
case law. The current doctrine provides that to establish the 
procedural unconscionability of a term, a plaintiff must prove that 
there was no voluntary meeting of the minds of the parties.173 This 
circumstance should be analyzed considering all the factors involved 
in the transaction, including the different bargaining powers of the 
parties; “hidden or unduly complex contract terms; the adhesive 
nature of the contract; and the manner and setting in which the 
contract was formed.”174 The standard created by our courts includes 
too many factors and does not provide a clear definition of procedural 
unconscionability. 
Conversely, the Directive provides a more straightforward solution 
which states that a term is procedurally unfair when it has not been 
negotiated in full. This concept is further expanded in Article 3.2 of 
the Directive, which states: “A term shall always be regarded as not 
individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the 
consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the 
term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard 
contract.”175 
Unlike our doctrine, the Directive does not provide a multitude of 
factors to be considered in determining whether a term has been 
procedurally unconscionable. The Directive provides that full 
negotiation of a term may cure any procedurally unconscionable 
term.176 In particular, and with reference to adhesion contracts, the 
Directive shifts the burden of proof onto the business, and it provides 
that full negotiation should be interpreted as giving the consumer an 
opportunity to influence the substance of the term.177 
 
172 See supra Part II.B. 
173 New v. GameStop, Inc., 753 S.E.2d 62, 70 (W. Va. 2013). 
174 Id. at 75. 
175 Council Directive 93/13, on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, art. 3.2, 1993 
O.J. (L 95) (EEC). 
176 Id. at art. 3.1. 
177 Id. at art. 3.2. 
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This comparative analysis of the EU and U.S. systems seems to 
suggest that the problems related to substantive unconscionability 
might be solved by a regulation that provides a clear understanding of 
its meaning, defines unconscionable terms, and includes a list of 
terms that are assumed to be substantively unconscionable. 
Additionally, the problems related to procedural unconscionability 
might be solved through regulation that focuses on the importance of 
negotiation before contract formation and gives consumers a proper 
opportunity to influence the substance of the terms. While the 
substantive unconscionability solution in the Directive may be 
directly imported into our proposed regulation, the European solution 
related to procedural unconscionability needs some fine tuning that 
may help us solve the issue of inadequate notice of the existence and 
content of contractual terms to consumers. 
The Directive considers full negotiation of terms as a sufficient 
cure to any unfairness and abusiveness.178 By doing so, the Directive 
ignores that full negotiation is not the equivalent of voluntary 
negotiation. In fact, sometimes consumers do not have any choice but 
to contract with a business, maybe because the business is operating a 
monopoly, or because there are not valid or worthwhile alternatives to 
the businesses’ market. In these cases, while the parties may have 
fully negotiated the terms of the contract, they may not have been in 
the same bargaining position. 
European countries have implemented the list of unfair terms 
provided by the Directive differently.179 Some countries have 
interpreted the list as a “black list,” meaning that each and every term 
included in the list is always unfair and never curable by full 
negotiation.180 Some other countries have considered the list as a 
 
178 See id. at art. 3.1. 
179 For readers not familiar with the EU legal system, while regulations issued by the 
EU Council are immediately enforceable in each and every country of the European 
Union, with no need of further adoption or ratification by these countries, the directives 
are rules that each country has to adopt and enact in their own territories. The EU 
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts provides that its provisions should be 
considered as the minimum required, and that each country is entitled to enact stronger 
rules for the protection of consumers. See, in particular, Article 8 of the EU Directive: 
“Member States may adopt or retain the most stringent provisions compatible with the 
Treaty in the area covered by this Directive, to ensure a maximum degree of protection for 
the consumer.” Id. at art. 8. 
180 Martin Ebers, La Revisione del Diritto Europeo del Consumatore: l’Attuazione Nei 
Paesi Membri della Direttiva Sulle Clausole Abusive (93/13/CEE) e le Prospettive 
d’Ulteriore Armonizzazione, 2 CONTRATTO E IMPRESA/EUROPA 696, 712–14 (2007). 
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“grey list,” meaning that terms included in this list are considered 
unfair and abusive unless the defendant can prove that the terms have 
been fully negotiated.181 Finally, other countries have adopted a 
mixed solution, listing some of the terms of the Directive as 
absolutely unfair and abusive—and therefore not curable through full 
negotiation and other terms as being abusive and unfair unless fully 
negotiated.182 
The most balanced and interesting solution is the one adopted by 
countries that use the mixed approach. Having specific terms included 
in a “black list” means that these countries consider these terms so 
harmful to consumers that they cannot be cured by full negotiation. At 
the same time, having terms in a “grey list” allows flexibility in 
contracts, and businesses will not have to worry about unfair and 
abusive terms eventually included in a contract, as long as these terms 
were fully negotiated with consumers. If the consumer was pressured 
during the formation of the contract, but the term was fully negotiated 
and the same term is not in the “black list,” freedom of contract will 
take precedence; the term is not considered to create relevant concern 
for consumers’ protection, and under a big picture analysis, 
consumers will benefit from freedom of contract. 
The second fine tuning that the Directive needs is related to the 
meaning of “full negotiation” under Article 3.1 and the requirement 
that consumers have an opportunity to influence the contractual terms 
under Article 3.2. Again, it is helpful to see how single countries in 
Europe have implemented the Directive differently. Here, the 
approach of the Italian legislature is of particular relevance. 
The Directive has been implemented in Italy as part of the 
Consumer Code183 and overlaps with provisions already included in 
the Italian Civil Code with reference to adhesion contracts.184 In 
particular, Article 1341 of the Italian Civil Code provides that specific 
unfair and abusive contractual terms are not enforceable when 




183 Decreto Legislativo 6 settembre 2005, n. 206 (It.), available at http://www.agcm.it 
/en/list-consumer-protection/1725-legislative-decree-no-206-of-6-september-2005             
-consumer-code.html (English version). 
184 See Domenica Cuzzola, La Tutela della Parte Contrattuale Debole, CENTRO DI 
ORIENTAMENTO GIURIDICO DEL CONSUMATORE, http://www.giurisconsumatori.it/index 
.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12%3Ala-tutela-della-parte-contrattuale        
-debole-avv-d-cuzzola&catid=3%3Anotizie&Itemid=4&showall=1 (last visited Nov. 13, 
2014). 
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approves them in writing.185 More specifically, Italian adhesion 
contracts require two signatures in order to be properly executed.186 
The first signature must be placed at the end of the contract.187 The 
second signature must be placed right after an additional clause, 
specifically indicating the clauses of the contract that are considered 
unfair under the Consumer Code.188 Through an additional signature, 
the legislature wants to ensure that the weaker party in the contract 
has actual notice of the existence and content of the potentially 
abusive and unfair terms. 
The Consumer Code does not refer to Article 1341 of the Italian 
Civil Code, and it merely matches the text of the EU Directive. Italian 
courts have interpreted the “full negotiation” requirement of the 
Directive as having been implemented in the Consumer Code, and 
they have distinguished the requirement of full negotiation from the 
requirement of the double signature under Article 1341.189 In other 
words, courts have interpreted the Consumer Code to include the “full 
negotiation” requirement, and it cannot be met by approving unfair 
and abusive terms in writing, pursuant to Article 1341.190 The full 
requirement is met only when it is proved that the consumer actively 
participated in the contract formation since an early stage of the 
negotiation.191 This creates two different standards in the Italian 
system. On one hand, the standard from Article 1341 (the double 
signature requirement) applies to adhesion contracts in general. On 
the other hand, the “full negotiation and active participation” standard 
applies to adhesion contracts involving consumers. 
Italy’s interpretation is not advisable because it places a heavy 
burden of proof on businesses, thus impairing online contracts. 
 
185 Gino Gorla, Standard Conditions and Form Contracts in Italian Law, 11 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 1, 2 (1962). 
186 Id. at 12–13; see also Cass. civ., sez. III., 17 marzo 1998, n. 2849, Giust. civ. 1998, 
594 (It.); Cass. civ., sez. II., 5 novembre 1999, n. 12296, Dir. e prat. soc. 2000, f. 3, 53 
(It.). 
187 See Gorla, supra note 185, at 12–13. 
188 See id. 
189 See Trib. Genova, 19 febbraio 2003, Giur. merito, 2003, I, 2439 (It.) (“The specific 
negotiation related to the unfair terms adopted in consumer contracts can’t be proven only 
by an agreement in writing over those specific unfair terms, but it must consist in an active 
participation of the consumer in the negotiation process from the drafting of the unfair 
terms. If this active participation is not proven, the unfair terms are void and null.”); see 
also Giud. Pace Strambino, 26 giugno 1997, Giur. It. 1998. 
190 Trib. Genova, 19 febbraio 2003, Giur. merito, 2003, I, 2439 (It.). 
191 Giud. Pace Strambino, 26 giugno 1997, Giur. merito, 1998, I, 951 (It.). 
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Requiring a true interaction between businesses and consumers in 
drafting an adhesion contract is not feasible in the reality of adhesion 
contracts in general and online contracts in particular. The 
consequence of a “black/grey list” system, such as the one adopted in 
Italy, is that it is transformed in practice into a de facto “black list” 
system. 
A far better solution would be to adopt the Article 1341 solution of 
the Italian Civil Code—also with reference to consumer contracts—
and require businesses to have consumers specifically approve any 
abusive and unfair terms included in the contract. This solution might 
also help solve one of the main issues highlighted at the beginning of 
this Part—the lack of adequate notice of the existence and content of 
contractual terms that consumers receive in light of the current 
browse-wrap doctrine.192 
The double signature system of Article 1341 might be incorporated 
into our system under the form of alerts that might be displayed on 
the screen to consumers, informing them of the existence and content 
of unconscionable terms. These alerts should require users to click on 
them in order to give specific approval, in the same way that Article 
1341 requires the weaker party to specifically sign the clause related 
to abusive and unfair terms. Only after this click would the abusive 
and unfair terms become binding on the consumer.193 
B. Clarity of the Content of Alerts 
An alert inviting consumers to simply “read the online privacy 
policies” would not be an adequate alert, and it would only just 
slightly improve the notice given under the current browse-wrap 
doctrine. At the same time, complex wording would not be sufficient, 
either, because consumers would ignore it or fail to understand it. 
Thus, complex wording would not achieve the result of actual notice 
to consumers on the presence and content of abusive and unfair terms 
in the contract. This would transform online contracts into traditional 
adhesion contracts, and the issues related to the duty to read would 
just be replicated. 
 
192 See supra Part II.A. 
193 In the case of a browse-wrap agreement, the alert concerning the abusive terms 
should be displayed the first time consumers visit a website. Any contractual term 
provided by the website would bind consumers only after they latter click on the alert and 
approve the term. 
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Again, the EU Directive on Unfair Terms may be a source of 
inspiration. Article 5 of the Directive provides that: “In the case of 
contracts where all or certain terms offered to the consumer are in 
writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible 
language. Where there is doubt about the meaning of a term, the 
interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail.”194 
While the second part of the above provision is, in fact, a replica of 
the contra proferentem doctrine broadly adopted in our system,195 the 
first part of the Article adds something new. In view of this provision, 
examples of terms such as the ones provided above would not be 
sufficient, and companies would be required to provide much clearer 
wording. Instead, specific alerts or provisions such as the following 
would suffice: “By clicking here you agree to litigate any dispute that 
may arise from the use of this website before the court located in Los 
Angeles, CA. For more information, consult our terms of service 
[LINK].” 
This wording would be sufficiently clear, and it would put 
consumers on notice of the consequences of agreeing to the 
contractual terms offered by the business. Consumers could then click 
on the hyperlink in the alert message to obtain additional information 
on the terms of service, but this would not affect contract formation. 
C. Usability Issues 
Web usability196 and user experience (UX)197 should be taken into 
account when considering new options for the law governing contract 
 
194 Council Directive 93/13, on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, art. 8, 1993 O.J. 
(L 95) (EEC). 
195 See SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 32:12 (4th ed. 1999) (“Ambiguity—the possibility that a word or phrase in 
a contract might be reasonably and plausibly subject to more than one meaning—
frequently occurs in the language used by the parties to express their meaning. Since the 
language is presumptively within the control of the party drafting the agreement, it is a 
generally accepted principle that any ambiguity in that language will be interpreted against 
the drafter. This rule is frequently described under the Latin term of contra proferentem, 
literally, against the offeror, he who puts forth, or proffers or offers the language.”). 
196 Web Usability, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_usability (last 
modified Dec. 19, 2014) (“Web usability is the ease of use of a website. Some broad goals 
of usability are the presentation of information and choices in a clear and concise way, a 
lack of ambiguity and the placement of important items in appropriate areas. One 
important element of web usability is ensuring that the content works on various devices 
and browsers.”). 
197 User Experience, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_experience (last 
modified Dec. 25, 2014) (“User Experience (UX) involves a person’s behaviors, attitudes, 
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formation online. Websites spend significant resources to refine their 
users’ experience and most of the time the success of an online 
product—be it a social network, a search engine, or any other website 
that provides interactive services to users—depends on its usability 
and UX. For example, Google did not invent search engines, but it 
made using them particularly easy. Having a clean, white, and 
minimal search page—in which the only visible components are the 
Google logo and the search field—was central to the company’s 
success.198 The algorithm adopted by Google to rank Internet content 
was, of course, another relevant factor in its success.199 
Usability and UX are relevant to users’ sign-up flow on websites 
such as Twitter and Facebook. These companies invest a lot of their 
resources perfecting the different stages through which a user is 
guided to create a new account.200 The less invasive this process is, 
the more users will sign up for the services provided by these 
companies. The more users the company has, the more opportunities 
for monetization the company will have. 
For example, at the time of writing of this Article, any new user 
visiting Twitter’s home page has to go through a two-step process to 
create a new account.201 The first step is completed on the homepage, 
where the user fills in a form with their full name, e-mail, and 
 
and emotions about using a particular product, system or service. User Experience 
includes the practical, experiential, affective, meaningful and valuable aspects of human–
computer interaction and product ownership. Additionally, it includes a person’s 
perceptions of system aspects such as utility, ease of use and efficiency. User Experience 
may be considered subjective in nature to the degree that it is about individual perception 
and thought with respect to the system. User Experience is dynamic as it is constantly 
modified over time due to changing usage circumstances and changes to individual 
systems as well as the wider usage context in which they can be found.”). 
198 Alan Siegel, How Google Wins Over Users by Giving Them Less, CO.DESIGN (May 
20, 2013, 7:20 AM), http://www.fastcodesign.com/1672594/how-google-wins-over-users  
-by-giving-them-less. 
199 Linda Tischler, The Beauty of Simplicity, CO.DESIGN, http://www.fastcompany.com 
/56804/beauty-simplicity (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
200 User onboarding and UX are extremely important design concepts and fundamental 
aspects that each and every Internet company has to carefully consider and plan. For an 
idea of the importance of these concepts, see Morgan Brown, Stop Designing Pages and 
Start Designing Flows, SMASHING MAG. (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.smashingmagazine 
.com/2012/01/04/stop-designing-pages-start-designing-flows/. For the importance that user 
onboarding and experience has within Internet companies, note the recent effort by Twitter 
to improve these aspects of the company’s website. Josh Constine, Investors Fav Twitter’s 
Instant Timeline Onboarding and Retention Fix, Shares Soar 7%, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 12, 
2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/11/12/twitter-has-a-growth-solution/. 
201 The description that follows is based on my experience navigating Twitter’s website 
and status of Twitter’s website and pages as of July 1, 2014. 
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password. At this stage, the existence of terms of service is indicated 
only by a hyperlink at the bottom of the page in small, white font. 
The second step is completed right after clicking on the big, orange 
“Sign up for Twitter” button at the bottom of the form on the 
homepage. There, the user chooses a username. At this point, the 
existence of terms and their content is merely mentioned above the 
big, orange button that says “Create my account.” Included in a small, 
light gray box with dark grey text is the statement that “[b]y clicking 
the button, you agree to the terms below,” followed by a preview of 
22 words of a 3475-word legal document. The user can scroll down 
the text if he or she wants to read the full terms, but the user would 
need to scroll roughly 86 times to cover the full text of the website’s 
terms of service. In Twitter’s defense, the same page displays links to 
the full text of terms of service, privacy policies, and cookies policies, 
for a total of 5725 words (excluding cookie policies, which are 
presented on several web pages) that the user is assumed to have read 
when clicking “Create my account.” 
From the above example, it is clear how usability in the sign-up 
flow is important for Twitter. Consumers are guided flawlessly during 
the entire sign-up process; contract formation is never an obstacle 
because the existence and content of the contractual terms is just 
briefly displayed to consumers and never in an obstructive way. 
Unfortunately, this execution does not take into account the interests 
of consumers to be properly informed of their rights and obligations. 
This is where the analysis presented in the previous Part202 comes to 
mind, and it suggests additional ideas to reform our online contract 
discipline and doctrine. 
Under the solution proposed by this Article, Twitter should display 
the content of any unconscionable terms in a way that makes them 
clearly visible to users. The wording of the alert should be sufficiently 
clear as to put consumers on notice of the existence and content of 
these terms. Finally, consumers should be required to accept these 
terms by clicking on them to make them disappear, for example, or by 
clicking on an “OK” button placed in the same alert. 
While this proposed alert may decrease the website’s usability, it is 
interesting to observe that websites already have to display this type 
of alert every time they conduct business in Europe to comply with 
 
202 See supra Part IV.A. 
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the EU Cookie Directive.203 The EU Cookie Directive provides for 
one single alert related to cookies. The solution proposed in this 
Article would require, on the contrary, alerts for each and every 
unconscionable term. 
Websites could implement UI and UX solutions that would not 
affect users’ experience.204 But it is relevant to remember that courts 
first endorsed adhesion contracts to allow businesses to flourish 
during delicate times or difficult market conditions. Websites no 
longer face obstacles directly connected to the innovative nature of 
online commerce. Therefore, it is time to remove the training wheels 
from the Internet bicycle and call these companies back to stricter 
contract formation rules, slightly adapted to the needs of this 
particular market. 
D. Expanding the Analysis to Invasive Terms 
While adopting the EU Directive’s approach205 would allow for 
clearer regulation of unconscionable terms in adhesion contracts and 
online contracts, it would not solve the problem of invasive or 
unexpected terms.206 These terms, as explained in previous Sections 
of this Article,207 would escape from the tangle of the 
unconscionability doctrine mostly because they would not meet the 
requirements of substantive unconscionability. But consumers should 
still be informed of their presence, and they should specifically 
approve them as they would approve unconscionable terms. 
At the same time, requiring businesses to alert consumers about 
invasive and unexpected terms may seem a stretch, as these terms 
may appear as less dangerous than unconscionable terms, and the 
adoption of measures designed for these latter terms would seem 
unjustified. This is not true. As previously discussed, invasive and 
unexpected terms may be more dangerous to consumers than the 
typical unconscionable term for several reasons. One of the reasons is 
 
203 Council Directive 2009/136, on Universal Service and Users’ Rights Relating to 
Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11 (EC). The EU 
Cookie Directive requires that websites display an alert message to inform users of the use 
of cookies. Id. Any website operating in the EU must comply with the Directive. Id. 
204 For example, websites could display these alerts with different timing. Terms related 
to any license granted to the website on the content posted by users could be displayed, for 
example, after registration and only when the first content will be posted. 
205 See supra Part IV.A. 
206 See supra Part II.C. 
207 See supra Part II.C. 
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the effect that social pressure has on consumers’ attention span.208 
Another reason is that current technology allows businesses to pull an 
unprecedented amount of information from consumers. The value that 
this information has on the market causes businesses to include 
invasive terms in as many online contracts as possible, even when 
such terms do not have anything to do with the cause of the contract. 
However, if it is clear that invasive and unexpected terms should 
be subject to a regulation similar to the one governing unconscionable 
terms, we should decide how to legally define invasive terms. We 
may consider the approach taken by the United Kingdom with 
reference to terms that are very similar to the invasive and unexpected 
ones described in this Article, in particular, the UK “red hand rule” 
doctrine.209 In Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking, Lord Denning 
reasoned that particularly onerous terms included in a contract—i.e., 
terms that a person would not reasonably expect in a particular 
contract—need to be brought especially to the attention of the 
consumer.210 The name of the rule comes from Lord Denning’s 
suggestion that these terms should be printed in a contract using red 
ink, with a red hand pointing to them. 
Having this rule in mind, we might have any term that would not 
be expected by a reasonable Internet user—in a particular contract 
with reference to the cause of the contract—to be clearly displayed on 
the website in comprehensible language. And businesses should be 
required to obtain specific approval of this term before continuing use 
of the website under a system identical to the one suggested before for 
unconscionable terms. 
The same analysis applied to abusive and unfair terms would 
similarly apply to invasive and unexpected terms as well. Supporters 
of the importance of websites’ usability should not be concerned by 
the fact that this new approach would need multiple alerts to 
consumers (for unconscionable terms and for intrusive terms). In fact, 
as previously indicated,211 websites could divide the timing of these 
alerts, when possible, and give them to consumers before binding 
 
208 See supra Part II.D. 
209 Christian Twigg-Flesner, The Implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive in the United Kingdom, CONTEMP. ISSUES IN L. 1, 2 n.10 and accompanying text 
(2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1399631; see generally Steve Kapnoullas & 
Bruce Clarke, Incorporation of Unusual or Unreasonable Terms Into Contracts: The Red 
Hand Rule and Signed Documents, 11 DEAKIN L. REV. 95 (2006). 
210 [1971] 2 Q.B. 163 (Eng.). 
211 See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
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them to contractual terms referring to specific actions to be performed 
on the website. For example, Twitter could alert consumers about any 
unconscionable terms when they create a new account. Then, before 
posting the first tweet, consumers would be alerted about the 
licensing terms that Twitter intends to enforce, and that these terms 
would be binding upon consumers only after they are specifically 
approved. If consumers do not approve these terms, they would be 
prohibited from posting tweets, but they would still be allowed to use 
other features of the website. 
V 
THE PROPOSED STANDARD FOR ONLINE CONTRACTS 
The current doctrines of online contracts allow businesses to bind 
consumers to terms that consumers most likely ignore.212 These are 
unconscionable and invasive terms, deeply affecting consumers’ 
rights.213 These doctrines are based on an idea of inadequate notice 
and implied consent.214 Consumers have the opportunity to challenge 
the validity and enforceability only of unconscionable terms, after the 
execution of the contract, and only by filing a claim in court based on 
the unconscionability doctrine.215 This system does not work because 
it places the control of fairness of contractual terms in the hands of 
consumers who are not legally educated and that, most likely, do not 
want to undertake legal action against Goliath-sized businesses. 
Additionally, the current doctrine of unconscionability does not 
guarantee certainty of results, given that courts must determine 
unconscionability on a case-by-case basis, using factors that often 
have unclear contours.216 
Inspired by the approach of the European legal system on the issue 
of abusive and unfair contracts, and the approach of the UK on 
unexpected terms, this Article suggests reforming UCC section 2-302, 
or creating a new set of rules which shall apply to online contracts 
and which shall include the following: 
 1. A clear definition of unconscionable terms, similar to the one 
provided by the EU Directive on Unfair Terms under Article 3.1. 
The definition shall consider as unconscionable any term that (i) 
 
212 See supra Part I.A. 
213 See supra Part II.B. 
214 See supra Part II.A. 
215 See supra Part III.A. 
216 See supra Part III.A. 
GHIRARDELL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  12:05 PM 
2015] Rules of Engagement in the Conflict Between Businesses 769 
and Consumers in Online Contracts 
causes significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations 
arising under the contract and (ii) damages the consumer; 
 2. A non-exhaustive list of terms to be considered 
unconscionable. This list should follow the “black list/grey list” 
approach adopted in some EU countries and include terms already 
considered in our system as unconscionable; 
 3. A clear definition of invasive and unexpected terms: terms 
that a reasonable consumer would not reasonably expect in an 
online contract, in light of the contract’s cause, and that affect 
consumers’ privacy and property rights; 
 4. A requirement that businesses alert consumers of the existence 
and content of any unconscionable, invasive, and unexpected term 
included in the contract. This alert should be worded clearly and 
displayed on the screen as a pop-up217 or as a top-page banner;218 
 5. A requirement that businesses obtain approval from 
consumers regarding the terms described in paragraph 4, by asking 
consumers to click on the pop-up alert or banner. 
Under the newly proposed approach, businesses would be required 
to act before the contract is formed by properly alerting consumers 
about the existence and nature of abusive and unfair terms. 
Consumers would not be bound by unconscionable, invasive, or 
unexpected terms, and these terms would not be assumed to be 
included in the contract unless consumers specifically agree to them. 
Furthermore, businesses would be put on notice that terms included in 
the “black/grey” list are to be considered unconscionable. 
CONCLUSION 
The suggested proposal would deeply change the way consumers 
are exposed to unconscionable, invasive, and unexpected terms in 
online contracts. The proposal would achieve this goal by shifting the 
current legal doctrine from a system based on inadequate constructive 
notice and implied consent to a system based on actual notice and 
expressed consent. At the same time, this proposal does not suggest 
completely discarding all the efforts undertaken so far, but it suggests 
to change some of the ways the requirements of the doctrine of 
unconscionability are met and proven. 
 
217 A pop-up is a message displayed in a new browser’s window, which is usually 
opened automatically once the user clicks on a specific link. 
218 A top-page banner is a message displayed at the top of a webpage, above its content. 
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This approach follows two different ideas. First, it tries to establish 
a fair balance between businesses, courts, and the legislature. It is 
time to force businesses to act under traditional notions of contract 
law. Second, it gives consumers the protection they deserve. 
Consumers should not be offered services under the false pretense of 
being free, while at the same time hiding terms from consumers that 
allow businesses to profit from their full profiling and tracking. 
The approach proposed in this Article would allow businesses to 
continue using online contracts to offer and regulate their services. 
And it would require businesses to adopt new methods to inform 
consumers of abusive, unfair, invasive, and unexpected terms. 
Consumers would be able to make the choice whether to accept them 
and continue using the website, or reject them, and perhaps choose 
another website with more favorable terms. It is time to consider 
consumers as intelligent creatures and to return to them the power to 
determine their rights and obligations as they exist in the digital era. 
 
